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For the third time in the last several decades, policymakers are
contemplating an overhaul of mortgage-finance regulations. Despite the
considerable attention paid to how ex ante regulations affect the availability of
credit and the appropriateness of the mortgage products that lenders offer,
however, our understanding of how the legal framework governing foreclosures—
a form of ex post borrower protection—affects mortgage lending is incomplete.
Leveraging data on loan applicants that are geographically proximate and
subject to the same federal mortgage-finance regulations and nearly identical
state foreclosure regimes—but for the presence or absence of a judicial
foreclosure requirement—this analysis enables the identification of the
independent effects of judicial-foreclosure requirements on loan approval
decisions and the share of approved applicants that are offered subprime loans.
I find that lenders adopt a more conservative posture in evaluating loan
applications in jurisdictions where they must haul delinquent borrowers into
court. All else equal, loan applications are less likely to be approved and
approved borrowers are less likely to be offered subprime loans in judicialforeclosure states. Further, some models indicate that these results may be
amplified for borrowers with lower socio-economic status, suggesting that
judicial supervision of foreclosures may have tempered one of the more flagrant
practices of the subprime era: providing high-rate mortgages with a greater
likelihood of default to lower-income and minority borrowers. These results
suggest that, in contemplating changes to the regulation of mortgage lenders,
policymakers should consider state foreclosure law to be among the tools in their
regulatory toolkit.

*

Harry A. Bigelow Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. Email: bfeinstein@uchicago.edu.
I thank Douglas Baird, Anthony Casey, Adam Chilton, Daniel Hemel, William Hubbard, and Lior Strahilevitz for
helpful comments, and Shem Boduch for assistance processing HMDA data.

1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 2
I. EXTANT & INSTANT RESEARCH ............................................................................................. 4
A. Literature Review................................................................................................................. 4
B. Contribution ......................................................................................................................... 6
II. FORECLOSURE LAW ................................................................................................................ 7
A. Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure .................................................................................. 9
B. Defenses to Foreclosure ..................................................................................................... 11
C. Foreclosure Law on the Ground ........................................................................................ 14
D. Other Features of Foreclosure Law.................................................................................... 15
III. RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................................... 17
A. Hypotheses ......................................................................................................................... 17
B. Sample................................................................................................................................ 19
C. Data & Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................. 20
IV. ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................... 22
A. Full Model .......................................................................................................................... 22
B. Bi-State Metro Areas ......................................................................................................... 24
C. Border Regions .................................................................................................................. 26
V. LEGAL FORUM OR TRANSFER PAYMENT? ........................................................................... 28
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 29
APPENDIX...................................................................................................................................... 33
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 51
INTRODUCTION
Approximately one decade after a global financial crisis sparked by U.S. mortgage
lending, policymakers are still actively debating the appropriate regulatory framework for
mortgage lending. For instance, on May 4, 2017 the House Financial Services Committee passed
the Financial CHOICE Act. If enacted, the Act would, inter alia, strip the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) of its enforcement authority concerning unfair, deceptive, or abusive
lending practices (Financial Services Committee, 2017). On June 12, 2017, the Treasury
Department responded to an executive order directing the department to provide
recommendations on how to “rationalize” federal financial regulations with a call to exempt a
greater share of financial institutions from Dodd-Frank-related restrictions, divest the CFPB of
substantially all of its authority, and replace the Dodd-Frank orderly liquidation framework with
a new provision of the bankruptcy code (Treasury, 2017). Not to be left out, the judicial branch
also is weighing changes to the mortgage-finance regulatory architecture; sitting en banc, the
D.C. Circuit is currently considering mortgage servicer PHH Corporation’s constitutional
challenge to the CFPB’s structure as a single-director independent agency. If any of these
changes are made, it would constitute the third major reconfiguration of the nation’s mortgagefinance regulatory regime in the past fifteen years, following a period of aggressive federal
preemption of state laws and loosening of federal regulations during the Bush administration and
the construction of a more robust post-crisis infrastructure during the Obama years.
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Lost in these debates is the potential role of state foreclosure law in regulating mortgage
lending. Almost half of U.S. states mandate judicial foreclosure, i.e., that lenders seeking to
foreclose on a mortgage file an action in state court. State courts provide a forum for borrowers
to challenge both their lenders’1 adherence to the state’s foreclosure procedures (the back-end) as
well as their behavior at the loan origination stage (the front-end), by bringing, for instance,
Truth-in-Lending Act claims and raising the equitable defenses of fraud and unconscionability.
In light of the importance of mortgage finance to the overall economy and the
psychological value that Americans place on homeownership, the stakes are too high not to
understand the effects of judicial foreclosure laws on mortgage lending. With the post-financial
crisis turn towards federalism in consumer-protection law (Metzger, 2011), and more recent
cracks in the federal banking regulatory infrastructure, a firm grasp of the effects of foreclosure
law on housing-finance markets is needed.
The benefits to borrowers of mandatory judicial foreclosure are readily apparent. Judicial
supervision helps ensure that lenders meet all requirements to foreclose, and court involvement
slows down the foreclosure process, enabling borrowers to remain in their homes, without
making payments, for a longer period. Yet, as the conflicting findings in the extant literature
show, the costs to borrowers of a mandatory judicial forum are contested. If the procedure’s
obvious costs to lenders are passed on to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates, then—
depending on one’s view of delinquent borrowers—judicial foreclosure either serves as an
inefficient form of insurance paid by all borrowers to compensate unfortunate ones or provides
an unfair windfall to irresponsible borrowers at the expense of responsible ones. But what if
judicial foreclosure imposes few (or no) costs on borrowers? Then the cost-benefit analysis
becomes more lopsided—with judicial foreclosure appearing to be more of an unmitigated good
for borrowers.
To determine the effect of judicial foreclosure requirements on mortgage pricing, I
compare loan application decisions within metropolitan areas that straddle state lines and in state
border regions, where one state requires judicial foreclosure and the other state does not. This
research design builds on past work on the relationship between judicial foreclosure and the
mortgage market by rigorously considering features of mortgage-lending and foreclosure law
that could affect mortgage pricing, and thus must be controlled for in the research design.
Specifically, this article considers two key features of the legal landscape that directly
bear on mortgage pricing, but which previous work ignores. First, the analysis is limited to
national banks, which—unlike state-chartered institutions—were governed exclusively by
uniform federal banking and mortgage-servicing regulations during the period under study.
Second, the study is geographically restricted to regions on either side of a state border for which
the two states’ foreclosure regimes are substantially similar except for the presence or absence of
a judicial-foreclosure requirement. Similarity in cross-state foreclosure regime is vitally
important, because state law differs in several respects that reasonably could affect mortgage
pricing; specifically, states differ in the number of pre-sale notices that must be sent to the
This article adopts the nomenclature “borrower” and “lender,” rather than, e.g., mortgagor and mortgagee. I
acknowledge the following: the original lender typically sells its interest in the mortgage to other entities; mortgages
often are securitized, making chains of ownership difficult to discern; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc. (MERS) or others often act as agent for the beneficial owner; and these agents typically hire mortgage servicers
to act on their behalf. For simplicity, the term “lender” refers to all of these entities.
1
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borrower, the timing of these notices, the borrower’s post-default right to cure and postforeclosure right to redeem, and the lender’s ability to seek a deficiency judgment. Accordingly,
a research design that ignores differences in the regulatory treatment of financial institutions or
glosses over the myriad differences in state foreclosure law in addition to the judicial-/nonjudicial-foreclosure differences would generate biased results. Departing from past work, this
Article brings the law into the analysis, considering differences in the regulatory treatment of
financial institutions and in state foreclosure requirements (apart from the judicial/non-judicial
foreclosure distinction).
To preview the results, I find that lenders adopt a more conservative posture in judicialforeclosure states, exhibiting greater caution in loan-approval decisions and, for those applicants
that are approved, offered fewer subprime loans. There are two competing explanations for this
result. First, lenders may reject a greater proportion of high-risk applicants in judicial-foreclosure
states. To the extent that these applicants, commensurate with their risk profiles, would
otherwise receive higher rate loans, their exclusion from the pool of approved applicants drives
down the average rate offered to approved applicants. Second, because lenders have a heightened
interest in avoiding foreclosure in judicial-foreclosure states, they may offer prime rates to
approved applicants in these states but offer subprime loans to identical applicants in nonjudicial-foreclosure states. Although this analysis cannot distinguish between these two
explanations, both explanations involve judicial-foreclosure requirements causing lenders to
moderate their high-risk lending.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of past scholarship on the
connection between state foreclosure law and mortgage approval and pricing decisions and
previews this article’s contribution to the extant literature, namely, that this study’s identification
strategy accounts for legal issues—i.e., mortgage-finance regulations, aspects of foreclosure law
apart from judicial-foreclosure requirements, and the component parts of a court-supervised
foreclosure—that introduce bias if ignored. Part II describes the legal framework in which
foreclosures are conducted: the mechanics of judicial versus non-judicial foreclosure, how these
procedures typically play out in practice, and how other features of state foreclosure law could
affect mortgage markets. Part III presents the research design for this study. Part IV reports the
results, showing that lenders adopt a more conservative posture in judicial-foreclosure states and
suggesting that this posture may be particularly pronounced for minority and lower-income
borrowers. Finally, Part V isolates the independent effects of judicial foreclosure as a legal forum
versus judicial foreclosure as merely means for borrowers to elongate the foreclosure timeline to
remain in their homes.

I. EXTANT & INSTANT RESEARCH
A. Literature Review
A large literature examines the relationship between foreclosure law and the behavior of
borrowers at the “back end.” For instance, Gerardi, Lambie-Hanson, & Willen (2013) find that
the borrower protections, including mandatory judicial foreclosure, serve to delay, but not to
avoid, foreclosure; by elongating the foreclosure process, these laws enable borrowers to remain
in their homes for longer periods post-default, but do not prevent borrowers from ultimately
losing their homes. Demiroglu, Dudley, & James (2014) find that borrower protections, again
4

including judicial foreclosure, are associated with higher default rates among underwater
borrowers; the authors infer that, by lowering the costs to borrowers of default, these laws
encourage strategic default.
Whereas the effects of foreclosure on borrower behavior at the back-end is wellestablished, the manner in which the legal environment influences lender behavior at the frontend, i.e., approval decisions and the loan terms offered, is hotly contested. One strand of research
concludes that borrower protections, including judicial foreclosure, increase loan costs. Meador
(1982) and Schill (1991) find that states with greater borrower protections tend to have higher
average mortgage interest rates; specifically, a judicial-foreclosure requirement, bar on
deficiency judgments, and existence of a statutory right of redemption are all associated with
higher interest rates.
While novel at their time of publication in the 1980s and 1990s, the Meador and Schill
studies contain methodological shortcomings; both involve regression models with relatively few
observations—each state in each year during a several-year period serves as the unit of analysis
in both studies—and a small number of state-level demographic variables included as controls.
Both studies’ use of states as the unit of analysis also assumes that there are no unobserved
differences among states—e.g., different local or regional economic conditions—that are
correlated both with borrower protections and mortgage interest rates.
Pence (2003) determines that borrower-friendly legal regimes are associated with a
reduction in mortgage quantity. Employing a methodologically rigorous state-border
discontinuity design, Pence examines approved mortgage applications in the mid-1990s—before
subprime loans became prevalent—in counties on either side of a judicial/non-judicialforeclosure state border. She determines that lenders offer loans that are 3% to 7% smaller in
judicial-foreclosure states. In a similar vein, Curtis (2014) finds that legal protections are
associated with fewer subprime originations, but does not observe a statistically significant effect
concerning prime loans. In other words, judicial foreclosure requirements are associated with a
reduction in the overall amount of lending, rather than a measurable shift from subprime to prime
loans. Curtis combines Pence’s methodological rigor (focusing on state-border areas) with data
from 2005 and 2006, which, unlike Pence’s study from a decade before, includes a nontrivial
number of subprime loans (Gramlich, 2007). Although the precise mechanism by which
borrowers absorb the costs of foreclosure protections differ in the Meador, Schill, Curtis, and
Pence studies, the basic takeaway is the same: whether through increased costs or decreased
quantity (or both), borrowers pay for legal protections.
A second strand of articles reaches a contrary conclusion. Harrison and Seiler’s (2015)
sample of almost 27,000 rate quotes presents findings at odds with Meador, Schill, Curtis, and
Pence. Controlling for local economic conditions and, in some models, focusing on cities on
either side of a judicial/non-judicial border, Harrison and Seiler find that—whereas borrower
protections such as a statutory right of redemption, anti-deficiency-judgment laws, and a lengthy
foreclosure process are associated with higher rate quotes—rate quotes are lower in states that
require judicial foreclosure.
Cao and Liu (2016) also find an association between judicial foreclosure laws and loan
terms that favor borrowers. Using the same Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and a
similar border estimation strategy as Pence, Cao and Liu find that subprime loans are 0.16% less
likely to be originated in judicial-foreclosure states; FHA loans are 0.57% less likely to be
5

originated in a judicial-foreclosure state; and conventional prime loans are 0.74% more likely to
be originated in a judicial-foreclosure state, controlling for a battery of applicant- and countylevel variables. That these changes almost completely balance each other out strongly suggests
that lenders substitute prime loans in place of less borrower-friendly products in judicialforeclosure states.
Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) further muddy the waters. These authors employ a borderdiscontinuity design to measure the association between state law and the size of the credit
supply in that state. Their reported coefficient estimates suggests a smaller credit supply in
judicial-foreclosure states between 1992, and 1995 and a larger credit supply in these states
between 1996 and 2006. None of these estimates are statistically significant, however, and in
most years the associated standard errors dwarf the coefficient estimates—a textbook null result.
B. Contribution
This article combines best practices from the existing literature concerning research
design with greater emphasis on the legal climate in which mortgage lending and foreclosures
occur. Taking a page from previous work, the study considers individual borrowers’
demographic profiles and exploits border-region discontinuities in foreclosure regimes to isolate
judicial foreclosure’s signal—and crowd out the noise of the many other local factors that may
contribute to loan terms. My research design then builds upon the extant literature by more fully
accounting for the legal complexity around mortgage lending and foreclosure. Specifically, the
research design pays careful attention to the legal framework in which home loans are made,
including variations in the legal regime that are likely correlated with lending decisions. Three
areas of the law come into play.
First, the article takes seriously the range of other state laws regulating mortgages. As
detailed in Part II, states impose a range of other requirements on lenders seeking to foreclose,
concerning, e.g., the number and timing of notices that the lender must send, whether the
borrower holds a statutory right to cure the default, the length of any post-sale redemption
period, and whether the lender is permitted to pursue a post-sale deficiency judgment. The same
logic that suggests that judicial-foreclosure requirements should have price effects applies to
these other borrower safeguards. Indeed, Harrison & Seiler find that several of these laws are
correlated with higher rate quotes. Yet research designs that compare demographically similar
applicants on either side of judicial/non-judicial state border ignore these other differences in
state law. This project, by contrast, focuses on borders between states with substantially similar
foreclosure laws—but-for a difference in judicial-foreclosure requirements.
Second, I recognize (and control for) the complex patchwork of federal and state laws
governing banking. In 2005 (the year on which this study focuses), lenders were assigned a
federal regulator based on the lender’s functional form. The Office of Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) regulated nationally chartered banks and federal savings associations; the
Federal Reserve System regulated state-chartered banks, bank holding companies, and loan
holding companies that are members of the system; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) regulated state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and state
savings associations; the now-defunct Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) regulated savings and
thrift institutions and savings-and-loan holding companies; and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) regulated federally chartered or insured credit unions (Jackson, et al.,
6

2006). In addition to Federal Reserve or FDIC regulations, state-chartered institutions also were
subject to state banking regulations insofar as these state regulations did not conflict with federal
law (Hoskins & Labonte, 2015). Finally, independent mortgage companies, which are nondepository institutions, were regulated mostly at the state level, with the Department of Housing
and Urban Development and the Federal Trade Commission playing ancillary roles (White, et al.
2011). Further complicating matters, federal mortgage-finance law preempted state law with
respect to federally chartered institutions—i.e., lenders under OCC, OTS, or NCUA’s purview—
but merely supplemented state law with respect to other lenders.
This regulatory tangle stymies comparisons of lenders located within different states or
having different functional forms. Accordingly, one cannot evaluate lending practices in states
with different foreclosure regimes simply by examining loan-application decisions from all
financial institutions in these states. Doing so erroneously assumes both that the same legal
framework governs lenders within a given state and that the same legal framework governs
lenders across state lines, but-for differences in foreclosure law.
I sidestep these identification issues by focusing exclusively on OCC-regulated national
banks. Because OCC regulations preempted state banking regulations with respect to national
banks at least from 2004 through the passage of Dodd-Frank, restricting the sample to OCCregulated lenders eliminates a major potential source of bias in the estimation of the independent
effects of state foreclosure law on mortgage pricing.
Third, the article presents a more nuanced understanding of judicial foreclosure. The
procedure benefits borrowers in two respects: it provides a forum for borrowers to contest
predatory loans and ensure that lenders seeking to foreclose meet the legal requirements to do so;
it also delays foreclosures, allowing borrowers to remain in their homes for longer periods while
in default. In other words, judicial foreclosure provides borrowers with both a legal forum and a
transfer payment. By including the average time from default to foreclose as an independent
variable in the analysis in Part V, the article sheds light on how lenders respond to each of these
components of judicial foreclosure.
To summarize, this article contributes to the literature on foreclosure procedure and
mortgage finance by recognizing the complex ways in which the law affects the mortgage
market. Specifically, this article’s research design accounts for the following features of the legal
environment: (i) the battery of state foreclosure laws—aside from whether judicial foreclosure is
required—that are discontinuous at state borders; (ii) the alphabet soup of regulators involved in
mortgage-finance regulation; and (iii) the dual benefits that the use of judicial foreclosure
provides to borrowers.
II. FORECLOSURE LAW
Before proceeding to the analysis, this Part provides a short primer on foreclosure law.
State law governs the foreclosure process (Fox, 2015). The lead-up to a foreclosure is broadly
similar across states. After the borrower has been delinquent in her payment of the debt secured
by the mortgage (or has failed to perform another obligation under the mortgage) for a period
defined by state law, the lender may consider the borrower in default (Rao & Williamson,
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2005).2 Once the lender or its servicer has provided the state-required notice of default and
informed the borrower of any loss mitigation options, the foreclosure process can be initiated
(Rao & Williamson, 2005). An acceleration clause in the mortgage is then triggered, causing the
entire debt to become due (Stark, 1997). This acceleration starts the clock on a period during
which the borrower holds an equitable right of redemption enabling her to pay off the debt and
redeem the property (Stark, 1997).
At the end of this period, the lender may file a lis pendens (in a judicial-foreclosure state)
or simply foreclose (in non-judicial-foreclosure states) (Stark, 1997).3 The key difference
between the two procedures is that, in a judicial-foreclosure state, a lender seeking to foreclose
the borrower’s equitable right to redeem the property must do so by filing a court action,
whereas, in a non-judicial-foreclosure state, the mortgage or deed of trust, on its face, grants the
lender the power to foreclose without judicial intervention after the borrower’s default (Fox,
2015).
States’ initial decisions whether to require judicial foreclosure were idiosyncratic.
According to Andra Ghent (2012), foreclosure procedures typically developed “very early in
states’ histories,” often before the Civil War. Ghent finds little evidence that economic
conditions motivated these state-by-state differences in foreclosure procedure. Neither was there
any discernable geographic pattern that could explain these states’ initial decisions to adopt
judicial versus non-judicial foreclosure. Instead, these differences are attributable to “path
dependent quirks in the wording of various proposed statutes and”—more frequently—
“decisions of individual judges” (Ghent, 2012).
Once established, states rarely change their foreclosure regimes. Since 1938, only eight
states have switched between non-judicial and judicial foreclosure (Ghent, 2012). Of the 37
states or territories for which Ghent was able to obtain data from 1863, only 11 enacted
significant alterations to their foreclosure procedures between that year and 2008. Once a state
decided – typically, in the 19th century – whether to permit non-judicial foreclosure, that initial
decision usually remained unperturbed through the present day (Ghent, 2012). (Today, however,
there is a discernable geographic tilt; states in the Northeast and Upper Midwest
disproportionately utilize judicial foreclosure, whereas among the western states, only Hawaii
favors that procedure.)
Further, states’ current foreclosure regimes do not appear related to current state-level
economic conditions or other factors, including mortgage default rates (Mian, et al., 2015).
During the study period, judicial foreclosure requirements were not connected to state-level
mortgage interest rates, default rates, leverage, the level of or growth in house prices, the size of
the subprime market, loan-to-value ratios, household income, racial composition, education
levels, or the unemployment or poverty rates (Mian, et al., 2015). States’ decisions whether to
2

After the study period, federal regulations set a minimum 120-day delinquency period before which a borrower
may be declared in default. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1) (Regulation X).
Following the financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act and associated regulations mandated that servicers – in both
judicial-foreclosure and non-judicial-foreclosure states -- provide notice of default and take additional steps prior to
filing for foreclosure. See 12 U.S.C. § 1024.30(c)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(b) (Regulation X). These federal
requirements were not in effect during the study period.
3
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require judicial foreclosure appear unrelated to either the contemporary housing market or other
political or economic factors currently existing in those states. Thus, states’ past and current
political and economic characteristics appear to be exogenous to states’ foreclosure regime
(Ghent, 2012).
Because the differences between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure are foundational to
this study, the following Subpart provides an overview of the two mechanisms.
A. Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure
Judicial Foreclosure
Judicial foreclosure begins with the lender filing with the court and recording in the chain
of title to the property a memorandum of lis pendens, which provides notice that the property is
the subject of foreclosure litigation (Rao & Williamson, 2005). The next steps are familiar: the
filing of a complaint, service of process, and a judicial hearing (Rao & Williamson, 2005).4 The
lender must prove that a valid mortgage exists between the borrower and lender, which typically
is shown by submitting the promissory note and mortgage document or, in most states, sworn
affidavits attesting to the ownership of these items (Carpenter 2015). The lender also must
proffer sufficient evidence that the borrower is in default; the lender typically meets this
requirement by submitting sworn affidavits concerning the amount of the debt and the length of
the delinquency (Mian, et al., 2015). The borrower then may file an answer or other responsive
pleading. Next, the lender typically moves for summary judgment. If the court determines that
the lender has proffered sufficient admissible evidence concerning the borrower’s default of a
valid mortgage held by the lender, the court enters a judgment of foreclosure (Mian, et al., 2015).
Following entry of judgment, the lender must provide notice of the pending sale to the
borrower and other lienholders, or publish notice of the sale, or both (Rao & Williamson, 2005).
The method and number of notices and the minimum amount of time that must elapse between
each required notice varies by state (Rao & Williamson, 2005). If and when these requirements
are met, a court-sanctioned foreclosure sale is conducted and the purchaser receives a certificate
of sale (Stark, 1997).
In 2005, eighteen states and the District of Columbia mandated judicial foreclosure.5
Another three states – Hawaii, Iowa, and Wisconsin – set such stringent requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure so as to severely discourage the use of that procedure. With the non-judicial
process used so infrequently, these three states can be considered de facto judicial foreclosure
states.
Non-Judicial Foreclosure

4

In some states, the judicial hearing is conducted before a judge; in others, by a master in chancery that serves as
agent of the court (Whitman & Nelson, 2004).
5

These judicial foreclosure states are: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Vermont (Rao & Williamson, 2005).
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Non-judicial foreclosure involves the lender’s exercise of a power-of-sale clause in the
mortgage or deed of trust,6 which permits the lender to sell the property if the borrower is
delinquent. This process, also known as power of sale, does not require court intermediation. To
non-judicially foreclose, the lender must send a notice of default to the borrower and, typically,
record the notice with the relevant county or municipal recorder. If the borrower fails to either
pay the debt or to dispute it within a statutorily defined period, the lender may file a notice of
sale (Mian, et al., 2015). After a proscribed period, a third-party trustee or sheriff conducts a
foreclosure sale or auction under power of sale (Stark, 1997).7
To initiate a foreclosure pursuant to the power of sale, the borrower must be in default on
a valid mortgage between the borrower and the lender. Although these are the same requirements
needed to judicially foreclose, non-judicial foreclosure places the burden on the borrower to file
suit to affirmatively contest whether these requirements are met (Carpenter, 2015). Specifically,
non-judicial-foreclosure states permit the borrower to initiate judicial proceedings by filing a
wrongful foreclosure action and seeking a permanent injunction against foreclosure at any point
between default and foreclosure (Pollock, 2010). (Alternatively, the borrower may file for
bankruptcy, which automatically stays the foreclosure.)
While borrowers are not deprived of their day in court, placing the onus on the borrower
to contest the lender’s ability to foreclose – rather than automatically require the lender to
demonstrate that the requirements to foreclose are met – places imposes additional time and
resource costs on the borrower. Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of power-of-sale
foreclosures are not challenged in court (Carpenter, 2015).
In 2005, 29 states authorized non-judicial foreclosure.8 Although lenders in most nonjudicial foreclosure states retain the right to judicially foreclose, they rarely exercise this right,
perhaps because of longer delays and higher transaction costs associated with judicial foreclosure
(Ghent, 2012).
Figure 1 illustrates each state’s decision to require judicial foreclosure or permit nonjudicial foreclosure (Rao & Williamson, 2005). The 18 states (and the District of Columbia that
require judicial foreclosure are displayed in dark blue. The three additional de facto judicial
foreclosure states discussed above are displayed in light blue.
While “deed of trust” is the preferred term in many states that permit non-judicial foreclosure, this manuscript
employees the terms “mortgage” and “deed of trust” interchangeably, following popular usage. The crucial
difference between a deed of trust (used in some non-judicial foreclosure states) and a mortgage is that the former
involves a third party: the trustee, to whom the deed of trust grants legal title to the property. As a neutral third party,
the trustee is responsible for conducting the foreclosure sale following default (Ghent, 2012).
6

7

Statutes authorizing non-judicial foreclosure sales generally are not as specific as judicial foreclosure statutes. Still,
the trustee – i.e., the third party to whom legal title to the property is entrusted in deed-of-trust states – has a
fiduciary duty to perform his function in a manner that is most likely to maximize the purchase price (Stark, 1996).
8

These non-judicial foreclosure states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming (Rao & Williamson, 2005). North Carolina, which is classified as a nonjudicial foreclosure state, requires a pre-sale hearing before a clerk of the court, in which the borrower may raise a
limited set of issues, prior to a power-of-sale foreclosure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16.
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[Figure 1: Mandatory Judicial Foreclosure Procedures, by State]

B. Defenses to Foreclosure
Substantive Defenses
Borrowers generally can raise three substantive issues, whether as defenses or
counterclaims in a judicial foreclosure or as claims in a suit to enjoin foreclosure, during this
period. First, the borrower may challenge the amount owed. In a random sample of almost 1,000
foreclosures filed in New York – a judicial foreclosure state – Emily Poppe found that 20% of
borrowers claimed that the lender failed to credit payments received (Poppe, 2016). Although the
validity of these claims in unknown, anecdotal examples abound concerning lenders attempting
to foreclose despite receiving funds from the borrower should have brought the note current
(Fox, 2015). Further, Katherine Porter’s (2008) study of bankruptcy filings found that, in 70% of
bankruptcies, creditors’ assertions regarding the size of the mortgage debt exceeded the
borrowers’ figures, whereas borrowers’ assertions exceeded creditors’ figures in 25% of cases.
That the borrower self-reported greater debts than the creditor in one-quarter of the cases
indicates that the issue is not simply systemic underreporting by borrowers, but rather often
reflects a genuine uncertainty on the part of one or both parties regarding the size of the debt.
Challenges to allegedly improper fees comprise an important subcategory of challenges
to the amount owed. Outside of the foreclosure context, Porter’s study of bankruptcy filings
uncovered that lenders and their servicers submitted proof of claims forms for myriad erroneous
fees. These erroneous fees included payment-processing charges, e.g., the inclusion of
prepayment penalties regarding loans that had not been prepaid,9 and illegal fees related to the
foreclosure itself.10
Second, where the lender provided misinformation or failed to disclose certain
information prior to loan origination, the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635, enables the
borrower, in limited circumstances, to rescind the loan agreement. Section 1601 of the Act
protects borrowers “against inaccurate and unfair credit billing . . . practices.” For material
violations of the Act, e.g., failures to disclose the annual percentage rate, financing charges, or
the payment schedule, the borrower may retroactively rescind the loan agreement and seek
damages. Claims under the Act must be brought within three years of the loan closing, and may
be raised as a cause of action or as an affirmative defense in a foreclosure action.11

9

See, e.g., In re Haque, 395 B.R. 799, 802 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (criticizing a servicer for including prepayment
penalties regarding loans that had not been prepaid).
10

See, e.g., In re Stewart, 391 B.R. 327, 343-45 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2008) (faulting a servicer for charging a borrower
for an excessive number of post-default property inspections).
11

See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411 (1998) (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)).
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Third, the borrower may utilize state common-law doctrines – most prominently, fraud
and unconscionability – in foreclosure proceedings.12 Whereas the National Bank Act of 1863
(NBA) and associated OCC regulations in effect during the study period preempted state laws
regulating mortgage banking, these common law doctrines remained in effect. Courts allow
fraud- or unconscionability-based claims and defenses in a variety of situations, including
extensions of credit to low-income borrowers for whom default was reasonably foreseeable; rateand-term refinances with inferior terms; and approving loans with balloon payments to
borrowers with fixed or declining income. These claims and defenses also are raised, often in
conjunction with a Truth in Lending Act claim, where the borrower alleges that the lender
misrepresented the terms of the loan (Rao & Williamson, 2005).
Aside from these three areas, borrowers in this sample had few non-procedural defenses
to foreclosures. As detailed infra, federal law preempted state anti-predatory lending and unfair
and deceptive practices statutes with respect to national banks during this period.13 Applicable
federal law does not permit private causes of action for predatory, unfair, or deceptive practices
or related violations.14 Although the Home Ownership & Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., provides additional substantive protections, e.g., prohibiting
prepayment penalties for certain high-cost mortgages, HOEPA plays a trivial role in foreclosure
defense; the Act applies to no more than one percent of subprime residential mortgages
(Gramlich, 2007). Claims that foreclosure is improper because the borrower is eligible for a loan
modification, while common in the years after the financial crisis (Poppe, 2016), were
unavailable in the study period, prior to passage of the federal Home Affordable Modification
Program and similar state mediation programs (National Consumer Law Center, 2012). Finally,
while federal law—namely, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.
(1978) and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 12601 et seq. (1974)—
provides for several rights of action against mortgage servicers for violations of mortgageservicing and debt-collection statutes, borrowers cannot challenge foreclosures based on these
violations (Rao & Williamson, 2005).
Procedural Defenses
Borrowers also may utilize several procedural defenses (in judicial foreclosure states) or
procedure-based claims (in non-judicial foreclosure states) to prevent foreclosure. First, they
may argue that the lender failed to meet notice requirements related to the foreclosure. Although
the details differ by states, lenders generally must send several notices (e.g., a notice of default
and notice of foreclosure sale), with the law prescribing certain content, delivery method, and
window for delivery. Should the borrower successfully contest the lender’s adherence to any of
these requirements, the lender must re-start the entire process (Carpenter, 2015).
12

In judicial foreclosure states, the borrower would raise these concepts as equitable defenses or counterclaims. See,
e.g., Mfrs. & Traders Trust v. Hughes, Case No. 99-C-5849, 2003 WL 21780956, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2003)
(applying Illinois law). In non-judicial-foreclosure jurisdictions, they would be raised affirmatively to support
injunctive relief. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dahlberg, 547 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
13

See infra Section __; accord 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,270 (Aug. 5, 2003).
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See Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 597 (1926) (holding that the Federal Trade Commission
Act does not authorize private enforcement).
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Second, borrowers may challenge lenders’ ownership of both the note and the mortgage
document, and, thus, the lender’s right to foreclose.15 In judicial foreclosure states, the party
seeking to foreclose must have standing to bring a foreclosure action; in non-judicial foreclosure
states, that party must be a “person entitled to enforce the note” under the Uniform Commercial
Code (Fox, 2015). (For simplicity, this Article will refer to requirements in both judicial and
non-judicial foreclosure jurisdictions as “standing.”) Importantly, lack of standing precludes
foreclosure in both jurisdictions, regardless of whether the borrower is delinquent (Pollock,
2010).16
In the rush to securitize mortgage loans in recent decades, compliance with the laws
regarding assignment of mortgage notes often has fell by the wayside (Poppe, 2016). When the
actual mortgage note is not properly transferred following the securitization and sale of a loan,
the owner of the loan will not have standing to foreclosure. As loans are sold and resold
repeatedly, the likelihood that the parties to these transactions fail to properly assign the note
increases. Unsurprisingly, gaps in the chain of title are common; one study found that the
foreclosing entity did not show proof of ownership of the note in approximately 40% of a sample
of 1,700 foreclosures (Pollock, 2010). In light of these failures to document transfers, lack of
standing is the most frequently raised defense in judicial foreclosures. A court’s finding that the
lender lacks authority to foreclose typically only leads to dismissal without prejudice of judicial
foreclosures or a temporary injunction in borrower-filed suits in non-judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions. The lender then may search for missing documentation or complete the required
transfers of the note or mortgage and refile the foreclosure complaint (in judicial foreclosure
states) or move to dissolve the injunction (in non-judicial foreclosure states) (Poppe, 2016).
Third, the borrower may claim that the documents that the lender proffered are false or
fraudulent. In a practice known as “robo-signing,” some lenders attempt to create a chain of title
post hoc, fraudulently creating back-dated assignments of notes or (typically where the note
cannot be physically produced) instructing employees to sign sworn affidavits attesting to the
accuracy of documents of which, in reality, these employees lacked knowledge (Fox, 2015).
Because judicial supervision is naturally more widespread in judicial foreclosure states,
defects in the chain of title and, relatedly, robo-signing practices are more frequently uncovered
in those jurisdictions. In the wake of robo-signing scandals and, relatedly lenders’ inability to
show ownership of mortgages during and after the financial crisis, three major servicers
voluntarily stayed foreclosure sales in 23 judicial foreclosure states. Notably, this stay did not
extend to foreclosure sales in non-judicial foreclosure states (Carpenter, 2015). Because there is
no reason to expect that chain of title problems and robo-signing would be more prevalent in
judicial or non-judicial foreclosure states, servicers’ decision to halt sales only in the former
states indicates that, for purposes of identifying defects in chain of title, mandatory judicial
process is more effective than granting borrowers an opt-in right to adjudicate. Examples of
forged documents and other lender misbehavior that did not interfere with power-of-sale
15

Aside from lack of standing, failure to serve constitutes the other major procedural challenge to foreclosure.
Allegations that the lender failed to serve a notice of default were raised in 46% of the answers filed in Poppe’s
sample.
16

The particular documentation needed to foreclose, e.g., proof of mortgage assignments, varies somewhat by state
(Fox, 2015).
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foreclosures in non-judicial-foreclosure states, only to be uncovered in later proceedings in
bankruptcy court,17 further support the conclusion that a mandatory judicial forum provides
greater protection to borrowers.
C. Foreclosures on the Ground
The on-the-ground consequences of judicial versus non-judicial foreclosure differ in at
least one important respect: the former takes substantially longer to complete than the latter. In
the late 1980s, foreclosures in judicial-foreclosure states took on average 152 days longer to
complete than did those in non-judicial-foreclosure states (Clauretie, 1989). By 2010, that
difference had swelled to 363 days longer (Nelson & Whitman, 2012).
Put simply, longer foreclosure timelines in judicial-foreclosure states are good for
borrowers and bad for lenders. Because there is little additional recourse available to a lender
post-default for each additional month in which the borrower does not make payments, the
borrower may continue to live in the house while withholding additional mortgage payments
with few associated marginal costs. By contrast, longer procedural periods in judicial-foreclosure
states impose costs on lenders, who must maintain the property and pay property taxes – or be
faced a dilapidated property with tax liens post-foreclosure (Harrison & Seiler, 2015). By one
estimate, foreclosures cost an average of $3,112 in judicial-foreclosure states but only $2,269 in
other states (Demiroglu, et al. 2014).
The longer procedural periods in judicial-foreclosure states also have second-order
effects. Because lenders bear the costs of delay, lenders in the first instance are less likely to
pursue foreclosures through completion in judicial-foreclosure states. In a sample of foreclosures
conducted from 2006 through 2010, Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi (2015) found
that that, whereas default rates in judicial- and non-judicial-foreclosure states are virtually
identical, lenders are less than half as likely to foreclose on delinquent homeowners in judicialforeclosure states.
Instead, lenders are more likely to pursue alternatives to foreclosure – namely,
negotiating loan modifications with delinquent borrowers – in judicial-foreclosure states
(Collins, et al., 2011). Essentially, the prospect of delay and attendant expenses incurred by the
lender in judicial-foreclosure states places the borrower at a relative advantage at the bargaining
table (Poppe, 2016; Whitman, 2014). Accordingly, fewer foreclosures per default occur in
judicial-foreclosure states – a win for borrowers in these states (Fox, 2015).18
Evidence is mixed, however, regarding whether (conditional on the lender attempting to
foreclose) the use of judicial foreclosure actually leads to substantially different outcomes. On
the one hand, because judicial foreclosure places the initial burden on the lender, seeking to
17

See, e.g., Carrsow-Franklin, 524 B.R. 33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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Owners of nearby properties and municipal governments also benefit when foreclosures are avoided. Spillover
costs—e.g., failures to adequately maintain properties, increased vacancy, and feelings of decreased neighborhood
stability among residents—often accompany foreclosures. These features tend to lower neighborhood property
values and discourage new investment (Mian, et al., 2015). Because fewer defaults result in foreclosures in judicialforeclosure states, these negative externalities are less frequently present. Similarly, because foreclosures reduce
property tax assessments, the decreased likelihood of foreclosure in judicial-foreclosure states benefits municipal
coffers (Wassmer, 2011).
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foreclose means that lenders must aver that all of the requirements to foreclose are met. Lenders
must make this averment in a court filing, subject to state court procedural rules requiring that
representations to the court be made in good faith and grounded in reasonable inquiry and
evidentiary support. These requirements may encourage lenders to think twice before improperly
initiating a foreclosure. Should the lender proceed with filing a lis pendens for an unlawful
foreclosure, the court presumably could serve as a backstop, rejecting attempts to unlawfully
foreclose (Fox, 2015).
On the other hand, borrowers generally do not avail themselves of important rights that
the judicial process affords; Poppe’s (2016) study of almost 1,000 judicial foreclosures found
only 21% of borrowers were represented by counsel at any point in the process. Further, whether
represented by counsel or pro se, most borrowers had no formal engagement with the legal
system throughout the foreclosure. Only 24% of borrowers filed an answer. Even when
borrowers did participate, they rarely alerted the court to potential defects in lenders’ claims.
Even the foreclosures that are most susceptible to challenge – i.e., case in which the lender likely
ignored procedural requirements – tend to be uncontested (Poppe, 2016).
Even more significantly, according to Poppe “the foreclosure process fails to ensure
lenders’ compliance with foreclosure formalities or protect homeowners from unnecessary
foreclosures” for the cases in her sample. In other words, borrowers’ abilities to raise procedural
and substantive defenses in judicial foreclosures do not appear to incent lenders to comply with
procedural requirements or discourage actual foreclosures in this sample.
Poppe’s analysis suggests a discomforting conclusion: that the ultimate outcomes in both
jurisdictions may be substantially similar. The notion that observed behavior under two legal
regimes is similar does not imply, however, that judicial-foreclosure requirements do not exert
any effect. Aware of the higher hurdles that they face in judicial foreclosure states, lenders in
these states could decline to initiate foreclosure proceedings in marginal cases in these states.
Alternatively, lenders in judicial foreclosure states could more rigorously adhere to legal
requirements at the loan origination stage, with the intention of ensuring that they do not have
problems foreclosing on the subset of borrowers that later default. Finally, if lenders want to
avoid facing a court in judicial-foreclosure states – whether because of the costs of delay
associated with judicial foreclosure or because their actions are susceptible to challenge – they
may tighten their lending standards and lean towards offering prime rather than subprime loans,
in an effort to reduce the incidence of later borrower default.
D. Other Features of Foreclosure Law
Judicial foreclosure is one of several borrower protections in foreclosure process that
some states provide. State foreclosure law also varies in terms of (i) the frequency and temporal
proximity of notices that the lender must provide; (ii) whether the borrower enjoys a statutory
right to cure; (iii) the presence and length of any post-sale redemption period; and (iv) whether
the lender is prohibited from pursuing a post-sale deficiency judgment (Rao & Walsh, 2005). All
four protections impose costs on lenders – and, therefore, presumably all four could affect the
market for mortgages, as lenders change their behavior in response. This Subpart discusses these
four key additional protections in turn.

15

First, all states require lenders to provide borrowers with pre-foreclosure notice, with the
specific content, number, and frequencies of these notices varying by state.19 At the high end,
the minimum time between default and foreclosure in Idaho and Oregon is 120 days, given these
states’ statutorily defined periods between notices (Rao & Williamson, 2005). Because notice
requirements elongate the timeframe for foreclosure – and delinquent borrowers may remain
their homes regardless of whether they principal and interest payments to their lenders during
this notice period – more detailed notice requirements increases lenders’ losses on foreclosed
properties (Cordell & Lambie-Hanson, 2016). Lenders, in turn, pass some of these losses on to
borrowers in the form of higher mortgage costs (Harrison & Seiler, 2015).
Second, 27 states and the District of Columbia provide a right for delinquent borrowers
to cure a default (Harrison & Seiler, 2015). In these states, if the borrower makes all missed
payments within a designated period post-default, the lender must waive all penalties and stop
the foreclosure (Rao & Walsh, 2005). Within the subset of states that provide this right, the
specific period in which borrowers hold a right to cure differs considerably (Rao & Williamson,
2005). Because cure rights compel lenders to accept resolutions that presumably they would
otherwise reject and leave lenders responsible for collection and legal fees associated with
abortive foreclosures, cure rights presumably increase costs for lenders. Once again, lenders may
transfer some of these costs to borrowers in the form of higher mortgage costs.
Third, 22 states provided a post-foreclosure sale statutory right of redemption to the
former mortgagor during the study period (Nelson & Whitman, 2001). In these states, the
purchaser must wait for the statutory redemption period – which ranges by state from three
months to three years – to expire before the purchaser is issued a deed of sale. After this period,
if applicable, ends and the court issues an order confirming the sale, the purchaser receives a
deed of trust (Stark, 1997). Statutory redemption enables the former borrower to regain title after
a foreclosure sale by compensating the foreclosure-sale purchaser the amount he or she paid to
purchase the property, plus accrued interest and other expenses (Nelson & Whitman, 2012).
Redemption rights may shift costs from borrowers to lenders in three respects. Most
directly, while the borrower typically has the right to remain in possession of the property during
the post-foreclosure redemption period, the lender is responsible for tax and maintenance costs
during this period (Nelson & Whitman, 2012). Redemption rights also generate uncertainty
regarding whether a foreclosure-sale purchaser will ever be able to take possession; this
uncertainty may reduce the purchase price (Ghent, 2012). Finally, because redemption in effect
grants a put option to the former borrower, the foreclosure-sale purchaser’s potential gains in a
rising real estate market are limited, which also may reduce the purchase price. Accordingly,
lenders may shift some of the costs associated with redemption rights by offering mortgage terms
that are less favorable to borrowers.
Fourth, several states prohibit deficiency judgments (Rao & Williamson, 2005).
Deficiency judgments allow the lender, following a foreclosure sale that does not yield sufficient
19

To initiate the foreclosure process in judicial foreclosure states, lenders must file with the court a lis pendens, i.e.,
a notice providing evidence regarding the debt, and send a copy to the borrower. In non-judicial foreclosure states,
the lender must first send a notice of default to the borrower (and, typically, to the court as well), and, after waiting a
statutorily prescribed period of time, file a notice of sale to begin the foreclosure sale process (Mian, et al. 2015).
Some jurisdictions – both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states – also require other types of notices prior to
sale (Rao & Walsh, 2005).
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funds to cover the borrower’s debt, to seize other assets that the borrower may have (Ghent,
2012).20 In other words, the borrower is still on the hook if the foreclosure sale does not cover
the borrower’s debt. By barring lenders from pursuing the borrower’s other assets following a
foreclosure and encouraging strategic defaults when the property’s present value is less than the
remaining debt (Ghent & Kudlyak, 2011), anti-deficiency laws may increase lenders’ costs.
Once again, some of these costs may be passed on to borrowers.
As with a state’s decision to mandate judicial foreclosure or permit non-judicial
foreclosure, these four features of state foreclosure law impose costs on lenders, and thus may
cause lenders to tighten their lending standards (to reduce the risk of foreclosures, which are
costly in states with these provisions) or offer higher rates (to pass on the increased costs of these
provisions to borrowers). Accordingly, this article’s research design controls for these features,
comparing states with substantially similar foreclosure regimes but-for their allowance of nonjudicial foreclosure.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN
This Part presents hypotheses concerning the effects of judicial-foreclosure requirements
on lenders’ behavior in two key areas: the likelihood of loan-application approval and whether
approved applicants are offered a prime or subprime rate. The section then describes the data
sources used to construct the variables employed in the analysis to follow.
A. Hypotheses
The hypothesized effect of judicial-foreclosure requirements on loan approval decisions
is straightforward. Judicial foreclosure saddles lenders with greater costs than they otherwise
would incur if permitted to foreclose. These costs include not only legal fees, but also additional
property taxes, insurance, and maintenance or depreciation costs, because judicial foreclosures
tend to take more time to complete (Fox, 2015). Since lenders consider expected foreclosurerelated losses in determining whether to extend credit, an increase in these expected costs should
cause lenders to reject marginal borrowers. Hypothesis 1 captures this logic:


Hypothesis 1: Lenders are less likely to approve mortgage applicants in judicialforeclosure states than otherwise similar applicants in non-judicial-foreclosure states.

The hypothetical effects of greater borrower protections on mortgage pricing are less
clear. Whereas judicial foreclosure imposes additional costs on lenders, it grants benefits to
borrowers by serving as a form of insurance; if the borrower defaults, she has the right to a
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Although the parties can contract out of this default rule in most states permitting deficiency judgments by
including an exculpatory clause in the original mortgage (which is then known as a “non-recourse” mortgage),
exculpatory clauses are rarely used (Ghent, 2012). Historically, most foreclosure sales do not cover the borrower’s
debt, making deficiency judgments a powerful tool for lenders (Wechsler, 1985).
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judicial forum and additional use of the property during an elongated foreclosure timeline (Fox,
2015).
Although the first-order costs and benefits of judicial foreclosure requirements to lenders
and borrowers are straightforward, how these effects impact pricing decisions are less clear.
Several features suggest that mortgages should be more costly to borrowers in judicialforeclosure states. For instance, if borrowers are relatively price inelastic, lenders may shift all or
part of their costs associated with judicial foreclosure onto them by offering high rate quotes—
with borrowers with the greatest likelihood to default on their mortgages assigned the highest
rates (Pence, 2003).
A judicial-foreclosure requirement also may stimulate mortgage demand via two
pathways—with this increased demand enabling lenders to raise rates. First, this requirement
provides a form of insurance to borrowers, allowing them to pool their risks (Schill, 1991). By
increasing aggregate borrower welfare, judicial foreclosure may stimulate borrower demand.
Relatedly, the presence of judicial foreclosure may allay borrowers’ fears about entered into a
mortgage with a potentially unscrupulous lender, and therefore stimulate additional borrower
demand for mortgages. Increased demand, in turn, may enable lenders to raise rates.
But lenders instead may try a different tack: lowering interest rates in judicial-foreclosure
jurisdictions. Loans with more onerous terms are more likely to lead to foreclosure (Poppe,
2016). Therefore, because foreclosures are more costly to lenders in judicial foreclosure states
(Fox, 2015), lenders may offer lower rates in judicial foreclosure states, on the theory that more
costly judicial foreclosures may be avoided by offering borrowers more manageable terms.
The need for lenders to face a court before foreclosing on a non-performing loan also
may encourage more borrower-friendly loan terms in judicial-foreclosure states. A lender
evaluating a loan application may look down the decision tree to a potential need to foreclose. In
a judicial-foreclosure state, that means considering the prospect of a borrower-friendly judge
scrutinizing the mortgage for potential violations of anti-predatory lending or truth-in-lending
laws, the presence of unconscionable terms, or any hint of fraudulent inducement. With this
potential scrutiny at the foreclosure stage in-mind, the lender may think twice about offering a
subprime loan with a high interest rate or confusing terms in the first instance. Relatedly, if
lenders are concerned that judges will uncover lender misbehavior, that concern may incent
lenders to take additional steps to avoid a default in states in which the lender must file a
foreclosure action in court. Lenders, therefore, could lower interest rates in judicial-foreclosure
states, relative to those in non-judicial-foreclosure states, to reduce the risk of default in the
former jurisdictions.
Finally, lenders may be indifferent to judicial foreclosure requirements when setting the
terms of new loans. Most prime loans are sold to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or another third
party shortly after origination (Pence, 2003). (Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac restrict
their purchases to conforming prime mortgages, other entities purchase and securitize subprime
loans and then sell these mortgage-backed securities to others.) The inability of these entities and
downstream purchasers of securitized loans to accurately price risk is well-established following
the financial crisis. If lenders’ practice of selling their loans to third parties creates moral hazard,
and if these third parties cannot adequately assess the quality of the loans they purchase, then
lenders may lack an incentive to account for judicial-foreclosure costs in setting loan terms.
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This cross-cutting set of strategic considerations does not yield a clear prediction
regarding the effect of judicial foreclosure on loan terms. For simplicity, Hypothesis 2 is phrased
as a theoretical negative relationship between judicial foreclosure and borrower costs.


Hypothesis 2: Approved applicants are less likely to be offered subprime products in
states that mandate judicial foreclosure.

Mortgage-finance outcomes are markedly worse for African American and Hispanic
borrowers. In 2000, the national homeownership rate was 73.8% for non-Hispanic whites, 47.2%
for African Americans, and 45.5% for Hispanics. That year, black applicants were denied at
almost twice the rate of white applicants; Hispanic applicants were 41% less likely to be
approved than were white applicants (Ross & Yinger, 2003). And when minority applicants are
approved, they are substantially more likely to receive subprime loans, even when controlling for
other borrower demographic characteristics (Bocian, et al., 2008).
These disparities persist after loan origination. During the financial crisis, the foreclosure
rates for African American and Hispanic borrowers were 76% and 71% higher, respectively,
than the rate for non-Hispanic white borrowers. Once again, this racial gap endures after
controlling for income and other factors (Bocian, et al., 2008).
Judicial foreclosure may mitigate these disparities. As detailed supra, mandatory judicial
foreclosure provides a forum for borrowers in default to raise defenses, including claims that the
lender provided erroneous information or failed to disclose material facts and that the loan terms
are unconscionable. Hypothesis 2 is grounded in the notion that judicial-foreclosure requirements
discourage lenders from originating loans with high interest rates or abstruse terms. To the extent
that lenders are more likely to saddle minority borrowers—or other borrowers with lower socioeconomic status—with these unfavorable terms, we should expect the benefits of judicial
foreclosure to be amplified for these borrowers. This logic suggests a potential interactive effect
of borrower socio-economic status and mandatory judicial foreclosure on loan terms, which
Hypothesis 3 captures.


Hypothesis 3: Approved applicants with lower socio-economic status, e.g., racial or
ethnic minorities or lower-income applicants, are even less likely to be offered
subprime products in judicial-foreclosure states.

B. Sample
To test these hypotheses, I gathered data on loan applications submitted to national banks
in 2005. In that year, OCC-regulated nationally chartered banks were subject to a particularly
strong form of federal preemption of state banking law. The uniform treatment of national banks
is essential to this analysis, as valid comparisons of lenders across state lines require that these
lenders are subject to substantially similar legal constraints.
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This uniform treatment was present in 2005. At that time, state banking law exerted
trivial influence over national banks for two reasons: federal law preempted virtually all state
banking law concerning national banks (Wilmarth, 2004) and federal regulators possessed the
exclusive authority to enforce state banking law to the extent it was not preempted (Cayne &
Perkins, 2004).
C. Data & Descriptive Statistics
After defining the sample as loan applications processed by national banks in 2005, I turn
to collecting data on individual borrower and loan characteristics. These data were obtained from
the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Final Loan Application Register dataset
(FFIEC, 2005). The HMDA requires mortgage lenders to provide regulators and the public with
information concerning their mortgage applicants’ demographic characteristics and the features
of their desired loans (12 U.S.C. § 2801(b); 12 C.F.R. § 203.1).
The HMDA covers substantially all mortgage lenders, including all lenders with over $35
million in assets and a physical presence within at least one metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
(McCoy, 2007). In 2005, 8,848 mortgage lending institutions filed 33.6 million loan application
reports under the HMDA. The OCC regulated 1,255 of these institutions, which filed 7.3 million
HMDA reports that year (FFIEC, 2005).
Dependent Variables
This study examines the effects of foreclosure law on two specific mortgage-application
outcomes: whether the application is approved (hereinafter, “Approval Decision”), and, for
approved loans, whether the applicant is offered a subprime loan (“Subprime Loan”). Approval
Decision is coded with a 1 for all approved loan applications, and zero for denials. Subprime
Loan is a dichotomous variable assigned the value of 1 for approved applications for which the
offered rate spread exceeds 6.5 percentage points.21 Both dependent variables are derived from
the HMDA dataset.
Table 1 reports summary statistics concerning these variables. For reference, Table 1 also
reports summary statistics concerning the “rate spread,” or the difference between the annual
percentage rate (“APR”) for each approved loan and the yield on a Treasury security of
comparable maturity as the loan.22

[Table 1: Summary Statistics: Dependent Variables]
Explanatory Variables
21

See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.32 (Regulation Z) (defining high-cost first-lien mortgages as, inter alia, those with rate
spreads exceeding 6.5 percentage points).
22

Beginning in 2004, HMDA has required lenders to report the rate spread only where the difference between the
loan’s APR and the comparable security’s yield exceeds three percentage points. For rates that do not exceed this
threshold, the value of Rate Spread is set at 1.91 percentage points, which is the difference between the average
APR for a 30-year conventional mortgage in 2005 and the yield for a 30-year Treasury bond when that security was
reintroduced in early 2006 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 2017).
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Judicial Foreclosure. The key independent variable in this study is whether the state in
which a mortgaged property is located requires lenders to foreclose judicially. Eighteen of these
states and the District of Columbia mandate judicial foreclosure; three additional states
technically allow non-judicial foreclosure, but place such stringent requirements on them that the
overwhelming majority of foreclosures occur pursuant to a judicial process (Rao & Williamson,
2005). (These three de facto judicial-foreclosure states are classified as requiring the procedure.)
Other Features of State Foreclosure Law. As detailed above, state foreclosure law varies
in several other significant respects. I control for the three most important sources of inter-state
variation: (i) whether the borrower holds a right to cure the defect, (ii) whether the borrower
holds a statutory right to redeem the property and (iii) whether the lender is barred from pursuing
a deficiency judgment. The right to cure a default (“Right to Cure”) grants borrowers in arrears
the option of paying the amount due (plus interest), thereby reinstating the mortgage postdefault. The statutory right of redemption (“Right to Redeem”) grants borrowers the right to
redeem the mortgage for a defined period post-foreclosure sale by paying the total purchase price
plus interest and costs. Finally, 13 states prohibit or severely restrict lenders’ ability to seek a
deficiency judgment, i.e., a judicial order that the borrower’s wages be garnished or his other
property attached when the sale price of a foreclosed property is insufficient to pay off the
balance of the loan (“Anti-Deficiency”) (Rao & Williamson, 2005).
Applicant Demographic Characteristics. The connections between potential borrowers’
demographic profiles and lending activity are well-established. Accordingly, I include applicantlevel demographic variables denoting whether the applicant is African American, non-white
Hispanic, or female, the natural log of the applicant’s income, and the reported loan-to-income
ratio. All of these variables are included in, or derived from, the HMDA dataset, reported at the
applicant level.
Loan applicants’ incomes and their prospective loan-to-income ratios are key measures of
applicants’ likelihood of repayment and, hence, necessary control variables in studies of
mortgage lending decisions (Bayer, et al. 2016). Accordingly, I include Income, which is the
natural log of the applicant’s gross reported income, and Loan/Income Ratio, which is calculated
as the requested loan size divided by Income.
Concerning race and ethnicity, the large racial gaps in homeownership, loan-approval
rates (Ross & Yinger, 2003), and rate quotes (Bocian, et al., 2008) motivate the inclusion of
Black and Hispanic variables. I also include a Female independent variable, based on similar
concerns regarding gender discrimination in mortgage lending (McCoy, 2007).
Area Demographic Characteristics. This analysis also includes four variables concerning
the demographic composition of the census tract in which the applicant’s contemplated property
is located: Median Household Income, Tract-to-Metro Area Household Income, Number of
Owner-Occupied Units, and Minority Population Percent. These variables were obtained from a
census-tract-level dataset maintained by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
I then merged these data with the HMDA dataset, which identifies each mortgage applicant by
his or her census tract. Because census tracts are relatively low-population units,23 these
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For the census tracts included in the FFIEC data used in this study, μ = 5,091; σ = 2,145.
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variables capture the demographic profiles of the neighborhoods immediately surrounding the
relevant property.
The following tables provide summary statistics concerning these variables. Table 2(a)
reports statistics for all 7.3 million loans application in the dataset, which is the population used
in Model 1 (dependent variable: whether the application was approved); Table 2(b) reports these
descriptive statistics for approved applications only, i.e., the subset of observations used in
Models 2 & 3 (dependent variables: the offered loan’s rate spread and whether a subprime loan
was offered, respectively). Taken together, the figures show only minor differences in loan
applications and approvals across these covariates.24

[Table 2(a): Summary Statistics for All Applications: Independent Variables]
[Table 2(b): Summary Statistics for Accepted Applications: Independent Variables]
Applicants from judicial-foreclosure states are treated in a substantially similar manner as
those from other states. Figure 2 highlights these demographic similarities among applicants and
approved applicants in both types of jurisdictions. Each point on the figure conveys the ratio of
total applicants (the x-coordinate) to accepted applicants (the y-coordinate) for a given
demographic group. Coordinates located to the left of the x=y diagonal line indicate that the
demographic group enjoys a disproportionately large share of accepted applications, relative to
its share of all application; coordinates to the right of the line indicate the converse.

[Figure 2: Loan Approval-to-Application Ratios, by Group & Jurisdiction]

Strikingly, most groups are clustered around the x=y line, suggesting that their share of
loan approvals are in-line with their share of loan applications.25 For many of the included
demographic categories, the approved-applications-to-all-applications ratio is higher in judicialforeclosure states than in non-judicial-foreclosure states; i.e., the point is located higher above
and further to the left of the diagonal line in judicial-foreclosure states. White, female, and
upper-income applicants are particularly likely to gain approval in the former jurisdictions
relative to the latter.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Full Model
24

Approved applicants are slightly skewed towards non-black, non-Hispanic applicants, have slightly more
conservative loan-to-income ratios, and reside in slightly more affluent areas. Contrary to expectations, however,
they also are slightly less wealthy themselves and reside in areas with slightly higher concentrations of minority
residents, however.
Of course, this finding does not address potential demographic disparities in lenders’ facilitation of loan
applications, potential borrowers’ decisions to apply for loans, or the terms of approved loans.
25
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Before introducing more sophisticated techniques, this Part presents first-cut estimates of
the effect of judicial foreclosure laws on loan approval decisions (Models 1 & 3) and the
likelihood of receiving a subprime loan conditional on approval (Model 2 & 4). Each model
controls for applicant-level demographic characteristics, census-tract-level community features,
and other state-level features of foreclosure law, as described supra. Because judicial foreclosure
may differentially impact borrowers with lower socio-economic status (see Hypothesis 3),
Models 3 & 4 also interact covariates capturing borrowers’ racial and ethnic identity with the
judicial foreclosure covariate. These models take the following form:
yi =

α + β1*JFi + β2*JFi*Blacki + β3*JFi*Hispanici + β4*JFi*Incomei + β5*Blacki +
β6*Hispanici + β7*Incomei + γ1*Xi1 + . . . + γk*Xik + εi

where:






yi is the value of the dependent variable—Loan Approval in Model 1, Subprime in Model
2, and Rate Spread in Model 3—for loan applicant i;
JF is a dummy variable equal to 1 when i is located in a judicial-foreclosure jurisdiction;
Black, Hispanic, and Income capture these applicant features;
X1-k is a set of independent variables concerning the demographic characteristics of the
applicant’s census tract and other features of state foreclosure law in the applicant’s state,
as described in Part III:; and
εi is random error term for i.

Table 3 reports the results.
[Table 3: Nationwide Regression Analysis]
The interpretations of the logit coefficients in Table 3 are not intuitive. Simulated first
differences provide another window on these results. Figure 3 reports the expected change in the
likelihood of loan approval (again, in Models 1 & 3) and the expected change in the likelihood of
being offered a subprime loan (in Models 2 & 4) when one moves from a non-judicialforeclosure state to a judicial foreclosure state. All other control variables are set at their average
values.26
Figure 3 reports these quantities for JF Requirement in each of the four models. The
figure shows that requiring judicial foreclosure is associated with a 2.1% reduction in the
likelihood of loan approval (Model 1) and, conditional on loan approval, a 1.0% decrease in the
likelihood of being offered a subprime loan (Model 2). (Models 3 & 4, which add the
demographic-variable interaction terms, yield similar results.)

[Figure 3: First Differences for Nationwide Models]

26

Specifically, continuous variables are set at their mean, ordinal variables at their median, and categorical variables
at their mode.
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The bottom-line conclusion from Table 3 and Figure 3 is that judicial foreclosure is
associated with more rigorous lending standards. Fewer loan applications are approved in
judicial-foreclosure states—but those loans that are approved have lower interest rates and are
less likely to be classified as subprime.27
These effects are amplified for loan applicants with lower socio-economic status. The
coefficient estimates on the JF*Black, JF*Hispanic, and JF*Income interaction terms in Model
3 show that applicants with lower socio-economic status are even less likely to be approved for
mortgages in judicial-foreclosure states than they are in non-judicial-foreclosure states. The
estimates on these terms in Model 4, however, reveals that, conditional on loan approval, lowerstatus individuals are less likely to be shuffled into subprime products in judicial-foreclosure
states than are borrowers with similar demographic profiles in non-judicial-foreclosure states.
With respect to lower-status applicants, Table 3 shows:


Lower-status applicants are less likely to be approved than their higher-status
counterparts in both types of states.



The loan-approval gap between lower- and higher-status applicants is larger in judicialforeclosure states. Lower-status applications fare appreciably worse in judicialforeclosure states than they do in non-judicial-foreclosure states.



Conditional on loan approval, borrowers with lower socio-economic status receive less
favorable loan terms than their higher status counterparts in both types of states.



The loan-quality gap between lower- and higher-status borrowers is larger in nonjudicial-foreclosure states. Phrased another way, lower-status borrowers receive more
favorable terms in judicial-foreclosure states.

The takeaway from these findings is that lower-status borrowers are less likely to be
approved for mortgages but, once approved, they tend to receive better terms in judicial
foreclosure states.

B. Bi-State Metro Areas
Although Table 3 provides an important first look at the relationship between judicial
foreclosure and lender behavior, the picture it provides is incomplete. Although that analysis
controls for many of demographic and legal features that may influence lender behavior, it does
not account for the full battery of unobserved features that affect mortgage supply and demand,
and thus may be correlated with mortgage-application decisions. This Subpart addresses this
identification problem by comparing lending decisions in metropolitan areas that straddle
judicial-foreclosure and non-judicial-foreclosure states but have otherwise similar foreclosure
Further, adding models employing as the dependent variable the aforementioned “rate spread” between the offered
loan and a comparable Treasury security indicate that interest rates tend to be lower in judicial-foreclosure states.
27
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regimes. I refer to these regions as “bi-state metro areas.” Applicants within a given bi-state
metro area are subject to the same housing market: the same supply and demand of housing
units, economic conditions, housing preferences, and other location-specific unobserved
variables.
Importantly, I only include bi-state metro areas that not only straddle a border between
judicial- and non-judicial-foreclosure states, but also that have substantially similar state
foreclosure laws in other respects. Specifically, the following features are substantially similar
within each of the included metro areas: the required number of post-default notices; the
minimum amount of time in which a lender may send all of these notices; and the presence or
absence of a borrower’s right to cure, borrower’s statutory right of redemption, and lender’s right
to seek a deficiency judgment. Appendix Table 1 provides more information concerning the
foreclosure regimes in the states in which these metro areas are located.
Thirteen metro areas meet these conditions.28 Therefore, I constructed a set of fixedeffects regression models, in which a separate intercept is generated for each metro area. These
models add the following fixed effects to the earlier national regression models: ∑𝐽𝑗=0 βj*MSAij,
where MSA is a series of dummy variables taking the value 1 when applicant i is located in
metropolitan statistical area j ∈ J.29 Other than the addition of metro area fixed effects, these
models are identical to the earlier national regression models. The results of these models are
reported in Table 4.

[Table 4: Bi-state Metro Area Regression Analysis]
The results reported for the bi-state metro areas in Table 4 are somewhat more mixed
than those for the nationwide regression models. Model 1 indicates that judicial foreclosure is
associated with a tighter supply of credit. Model 3, which adds several interaction terms,
includes a null result for the main JF variable.
Concerning the relationship between judicial foreclosure and the likelihood of approved
applicants being offered subprime loans, the coefficient estimate for JF in Model 2 indicates a
null result, whereas the estimate in Model 4 (which adds the interactions) is negative and
statistically significant.

Specifically, there are 11 census-defined metropolitan areas and two small “micropolitan” areas that meet this
condition. The metropolitan areas are: Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC; Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC;
Duluth, MN-WI; Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH; La Crosse, WI-MN; Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MNWI; Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna, WV-OH; Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD; Sioux City, IANE-SD; Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH; and Wheeling, WV-OH. The two micropolitan areas are Natchez, MS-LA
and Point Pleasant, WV-OH. Metropolitan (micropolitan) statistical areas include an urbanized area with a
population of greater than (less than) 50,000 and an integrated labor market with adjacent areas (OMB, 2009).
28

29

Notwithstanding the inclusion of fixed effects, these models also include standard errors clustered at the MSA
level. MSA-specific fixed effects likely control for only part of any within-MSA correlation or heteroscedasticity in
errors (Cameron & Miller, 2013).
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The following figure shows simulated first differences; as before, Figure 4 reports the
expected change in the likelihood of loan approval (again, in Models 1 & 3) and the expected
change in the likelihood of being offered a subprime loan (in Models 2 & 4) when one moves
from a non-judicial-foreclosure state to a judicial foreclosure state, holding all other right-handside variables at their central tendencies.
The figure shows that judicial foreclosure is associated with a 2.5% reduction in the
likelihood of loan approval (Model 1); when one adds the borrower-demographics interaction
terms, judicial foreclosure is associated with a 2.8% reduction in the likelihood of loan approval
(Model 3). The 0.2% estimated reduction in the likelihood of being offered a subprime loan in
Model 2 is not statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. When one adds the borrowerdemographics interaction terms in Model 4, the 0.4% estimated reduction is barely statistically
significant at this level.

[Figure 4: First Differences for Bi-State Metro Area Models]

The interactive effects of applicants’ socio-economic status and judicial foreclosure on
loan terms also are mixed. The coefficient estimates for JF*Income in Models 3 & 4 indicate that
lower-income applicants are less likely to be approved for mortgages in judicial-foreclosure
states than in non-judicial-foreclosure states, but when they are approved, they are more likely to
receive prime loans. Concerning JF*Black and JF*Hispanic, however, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the outcomes for African American and Hispanic applicants in judicialforeclosure states do not differ from applicants with these profiles in non-judicial-foreclosure
states.
C. Border Regions
A state-border regression discontinuity design provides another angle on the connection
between state foreclosure procedures and mortgage pricing. State-border discontinuity designs
figure prominently in research on state law (Pence, 2003; Mian, et al., 2015), and for good
reason: Mian, et al. (2015) found that a discontinuity regarding foreclosure propensity exists at
state borders, but, importantly, there is no similar shift in other features known to be correlated
with lender decisions—e.g., applicant income, credit score, etc.—at these borders. Taking a page
from other border-region discontinuity studies, I examine borders between states that differ in
their adoption of judicial foreclosure; I build upon these past studies by examining only those
borders between judicial- and non-judicial-foreclosure states with otherwise substantially
similar foreclosure procedures on both sides of the border.
There are 14 pairs of states in which lenders must go to court to foreclose only on one
side of the border—but where other features of state foreclosure law that could affect mortgage
pricing, namely, the number of pre-sale notices that must be sent to the borrower, the timing of
these notices, the borrower’s post-default right to cure and post-foreclosure right to redeem, and
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the lender’s ability to seek a deficiency judgment, are substantially similar.30 (Appendix Table 1
lists the included states’ relevant laws.)
Figure 5 depicts these state border discontinuities. The included states appear in
grayscale; darker shading signifies greater proximity to the relevant state border.

[Figure 5: State Borders Included in Regression Discontinuity Design]

The central identifying assumption of this state-border discontinuity design is that, aside
from the presence or absence of judicial foreclosure, systemic differences relevant to mortgage
pricing do not exist on either side of these state borders. Appendix Table 1, which reports the
relevant foreclosure procedures used in each component state within these 14 state dyads, shows
that the states’ adoption of other foreclosure procedures is substantially similar. This exclusive
focus on state pairs with substantially similar foreclosure laws—except for the presence or
absence of a judicial-foreclosure requirement—constitutes a significant advance over past
research designs, which include all adjacent judicial/non-judicial state pairs, regardless of other
differences in these states’ legal regimes. The method, therefore, assumes only that the values of
other variables that could affect mortgage prices—e.g., median incomes, home prices, etc.—do
not differ immediately on either side of the state border.
For each loan application in one of the 14 state dyads, I used Thomas Holmes’s State
Border Data Set to identify the approximate distance between the applicant’s county and the
relevant state border (Holmes, 1998). In each model, the assignment variable distance is defined
as the distance from the relevant state border. Observations for which distancei > 0 signify loan
applications in judicial-foreclosure states, while observations for which distancei < 0 signify
applications in non-judicial-foreclosure states. Formally:

yi = α + Wi*τ + β1*distancei + εi
where:






yi is the outcome measure for loan applicant i;
Wi is a dummy variable ∈ {0, 1}, such that W = 1 if the applicant is in a judicialforeclosure state and 0 if it is not;
τ is the treatment effect of i’s location in a judicial-foreclosure state;
distance is the distance between the applicant and the state borders, with distance > 0
for applicants in judicial-foreclosure states and distance < 0 otherwise;31 and
εi is random error term for i.

30

These 14 state dyads are: Connecticut-Massachusetts, Delaware-Maryland, Florida-Georgia, Iowa-Minnesota,
Kentucky-Missouri, Kentucky-Virginia, Louisiana-Mississippi, Louisiana-Texas, Nebraska-Colorado, NebraskaSouth Dakota, Ohio-West Virginia, South Carolina-Georgia, South Carolina-North Carolina, and WisconsinMinnesota. In each of these dyads, the state that requires judicial foreclosure is listed first.
31

The sample is restricted to applicants within 50 miles of the border.
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As before, the dependent variable in Model 1 is a dichotomous measure of whether the
loan was approved, and in Model 2 it is a dichotomous measure of whether the applicant was
approved for a subprime loan, conditional on loan approval. I ran the models separately for all
applicants (for Model 1) or all approved applicants (for Model 2), then ran them separately for
following subsets: African American applicants, Hispanic applicants, female applicants, and
applicants in the 25th and 75th percentiles for household income.32 Table 5 reports the results.
[Table 5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates]
Consistent with the previously reported results, Table 5 shows that judicial foreclosure
tempers lenders’ behavior. The likelihood of approval is lower in these states, but, conditional on
approval, loan terms are more favorable to borrowers. Further, there is suggestive evidence that
these effects are particularly pronounced concerning lower socio-economic-status borrowers—
particularly those with lower incomes.

V. LEGAL FORUM OR TRANSFER PAYMENT?

The overall message from the preceding analyses is that lenders adopt a more sober
posture in judicial-foreclosure states; they are less willing to extend credit in these states. When
they do extend credit, they offer more conservative, borrower-friendly terms. The natural next
question is why.
Three features of judicial foreclosure suggest competing possible explanations for
lenders’ differential behavior in judicial-foreclosure states. First, because judicial foreclosure
offers borrowers a forum to contest predatory loan terms, the procedure discourages lenders from
originating loans with predatory terms. Second, because borrowers can use the process to contest
foreclosure based on other forms of lending misbehavior, judicial foreclosure discourages
lenders from originating loans that they think have a greater likelihood of becoming delinquent.
Third, that the use of judicial foreclosure extends foreclosure timelines, thereby imposing
additional costs on lenders, also counsels in favor of lender restraint in originating loans that are
more likely to become delinquent (Demiroglu, 2014; Whitman, 2014).
The first two of these pathways consider judicial foreclosure as providing a mechanism
for borrowers to vindicate their legal rights. Because the balance of legal rights between
borrowers and lenders is tipped in borrowers’ favor in judicial-foreclosure states vis-à-vis nonjudicial-foreclosure states, lenders alter their behavior in the former states to reduce their
likelihood of having to answer in court for their actions. By contrast, the third pathway
emphasizes the economic effects of judicial foreclosure. By elongating foreclosure timelines,
I used the R package “rdbwselect” to select the coverage-error-rate-optimal bandwidth of 9.62 miles, using a
triangular kernel function and nearest-neighbor matching of residuals to compute the variance-covariance matrix
estimator (Calonico, et al., 2005).
32
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mandatory judicial foreclosure imposes costs on lenders. Thus, judicial foreclosure confers both
legal rights and economic benefits on borrowers in default (but also is associated with less
lending activity ex ante).
In light of these competing mechanisms, how can we determine whether lenders alter
their behavior in judicial foreclosure states in response to borrowers’ enhanced ability to exercise
legal rights in these jurisdictions or in response to the increased costs that judicial foreclosure
imposes on lenders?
To disentangle these effects, I add a new variable to the analysis: the mean time from
default to foreclosure in the state in which the applicant resides (Cutts & Merrill, 2008). This
Months to Foreclose variable captures delay caused by all features of a state’s foreclosure law,
including delays attributable to judicial-foreclosure requirements. By interacting Months to
Foreclose with the Judicial Foreclosure Requirement variable used in previous models, one can
compare the differential effects of a one-month increase in the average foreclosure timeline in
judicial- and non-judicial-foreclosure states, thereby isolating the independent impact on
mortgage pricing of (i) judicial foreclosure as a means of ensuring that lenders adhere to the law
and (ii) judicial foreclosure as a means of transferring value from lenders to delinquent
borrowers by delaying foreclosure.
Table 6 reports the results of these analyses. (Note that the models in the table include all
of the variables that appear in the bi-state metro area regression models reported in Table 4. For
ease of reference, the coefficient estimates on these control variables are omitted.)

[Table 6: Effects of Judicial Foreclosure Requirement & Length of Foreclosure Timeline
on Lender Behavior]
Table 6 suggests that longer foreclosure timelines are not what is driving changes in
lender behavior in judicial-foreclosure states. The coefficient estimates for Months to Foreclose
in all four models are trivial in magnitude and are dwarfed by the associated standard errors.
Likewise, based on the JF*Months to Foreclose interaction terms in all four models, one cannot
reject the null that increased foreclosure timelines are unconnected to lender behavior in judicialforeclosure states. The JF Requirement estimate, however, retains its substantive and statistical
significance in Models 1 and 4. In other words, the same results concerning JF Requirement that
were reported for the bi-state metro area models in Table 4 persist when one controls for the
average length of the foreclosure process.
These findings suggest that the need to seek court approval for foreclosures is what
causes lenders to change their behavior at the loan origination stage. The concomitant longer
foreclosure schedules in judicial foreclosure states do not affect loan-approval or rate-quote
decisions.

CONCLUSION
This article shows that lenders adopt a more conservative posture in judicial-foreclosure
states. Most models indicate that lenders are less likely to extend credit in these states and,
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conditional on loan approval, they are more likely to offer a prime-rate loan rather than a
subprime product. These findings are consistent across the nationwide linear regression and the
border-states regression-discontinuity model, and also are present in two out of the four models
focused on metropolitan areas that straddle states with substantially similar foreclosure regimes,
but for the presence or absence of a judicial-foreclosure requirement.
Substantively, the effects of judicial foreclosure on these two outcomes are not trivial.
The simulated first differences reported in Figures 3 and 4 show that judicial-foreclosure
requirements are associated with an approximate 2.1-2.8% reduction in the likelihood of loan
approval and, conditional on loan approval, a 0.2-1.0% reduction in the likelihood of being
offered a subprime loan. (One cannot reject the null hypothesis concerning one of the reported
first differences concerning subprime loan offer rates, Model 2 in Figure 4, with a 95%
confidence interval, however.)
While not monumental, reductions of this size in a sample of 7.3 million loan
applications are noteworthy. That these effects are observed in sample from 2005—when
relatively few properties entered foreclosure and, according to the conventional wisdom,
securitization led lenders to give scant attention to loan performance—is particularly striking. If
these results are generalizable to all mortgage lenders and for other years, then judicialforeclosure requirements may have altered hundreds of thousands of individuals’ ability to
access credit and secure a prime rate each year. Given the economic and psychological
importance of homeownership, and the potentially devastating risks of subprime loans to
individuals and communities, these effects are significant.
Further, there is suggestive evidence that the observed connections between judicial
foreclosure requirements, tighter credit, and better loan terms are amplified for borrowers with
lower socio-economic status. These connections are apparent for lower-income, African
American, and Hispanic applicants in the full model and for lower-income applicants in the bistate metro area and border-discontinuity models. By contrast, the notion that lenders “pass on”
the costs of this borrower protection in the form of higher rates is firmly rejected.
By paying careful attention to legal differences in mortgage-finance and foreclosure law,
this study offers a more rigorous look at the impact of judicial foreclosure on mortgage lending
than previous studies. Nonetheless, some qualifications are in order. For one, the need to use
2005 data for national banks—which, crucially, were subject to uniform regulations—raises
questions concerning external validity. The possibility that national banks mirror the activities of
their state-regulated counterparts presents another concern. If a national bank operating in, for
instance, New Jersey bases its loan approval decisions and rate quotes on the behavior of its
state-regulated competitors, then New Jersey banking law exerts an indirect influence on that
national bank. Finally, despite the fact that most states’ foreclosure regimes generally do not
change for decades and the use of a quasi-experimental border-discontinuity design, endogeneity
concerns are still present; namely, it is possible that states either select or decide not to change
their foreclosure laws based on features of the borrower and lender populations in those states.
The findings in this article suggest two potentially fruitful areas for future work. First, an
understanding of why lenders adopt a more conservative posture, approving fewer applicants and
offering a larger proportion of prime loans, in judicial foreclosure states is needed. One
possibility is that, because subprime loans have a greater likelihood of leading to default and
foreclosure (Pennington-Cross, 2004), and foreclosure costs are higher in judicial-foreclosure
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states (Demiroglu, 2014), lenders reduce rates for all borrowers in these states. Another
possibility is that lenders offer high-cost loans to risky, marginal applicants in non-judicialforeclosure states but reject these marginal applicants in judicial-foreclosure states, which leads
to an increase in the share of approved applicants that are offered subprime loans. Under this
second theory, the typical approved applicant is offered the same rate in both types of states; the
entire observed rate reduction in judicial-foreclosure states can be attributed to the smaller,
higher socio-economic status set of approved applicants in these states. Assessing these
competing theories represents a promising area for future research.33
Second, a more complete theory of foreclosure law’s place in the financial regulatory
architecture is needed. Law and economics scholars recognize that ex post tort liability can serve
a similar function as ex ante regulation (see, e.g., Landes & Posner, 1987). Judicial foreclosure
shares some broad similarities with tort law; both involve courts making ex post assessments of
parties’ past conduct and imposing penalties for misbehavior (in tort law, damages; in judicial
foreclosure, authorizing or disallowing the foreclosure based on the borrower and lender’s past
actions). Specifically, the prospect that a lender seeking to foreclose may be penalized for its
behavior at this stage may incent the lender to alter its behavior at the loan origination stage,
taking greater care to abide by the Truth in Lending Act and other laws. Given the costs to
lenders of judicial foreclosure, lenders in judicial foreclosure states also may take greater care
not to engage in lending practices – like offering balloon payments to low-income borrowers –
that increase the likelihood of default. In this way, borrower protections at the foreclosure stage
may function as a form of back-end regulation of mortgage lending.
These possible effects, however, are speculative. Given the potentially dramatic changes
in mortgage-finance and consumer-production law that are on the horizon in Washington, a
better understanding of the role that state foreclosure law can play in filling gaps in the ex ante
regulatory structure would be useful.
Normatively, whether tighter mortgage markets are desirable is in the eye of the
beholder. In light of the role that easy credit (often on subprime terms) played in the financial
crisis—with lenders particularly eager to reverse-redline by providing inappropriately priced
mortgages to minority and lower-income borrowers—the fact that judicial foreclosure both
provides a judicial check on lender misbehavior in the foreclosure process and encourages
lenders to be more responsible in the loan-approval process are strong points in favor of the
procedure. On the other hand, that judicial-foreclosure requirements lead lenders to reject loan
33

A third possibility is that the presence of absence of judicial foreclosure encourages different applicant pools in
the two jurisdictions. Judicial foreclosure may lead to adverse selection of loan applicants in the states that require it,
and the observed results may constitute lenders’ attempt to mitigate against this phenomenon. If potential loan
applicants view judicial-foreclosure requirements as a form of insurance, this insurance feature would be more
attractive to higher-risk individuals. As a result, high-risk individuals may constitute a larger proportion of the pool
of loan applicants in judicial-foreclosure states. Lenders would respond by adopting tighter lending standards to
screen out the greater numbers of high-risk borrowers in judicial-foreclosure states. This theory, though plausible,
seems unlikely, as it assumes that potential borrowers not only have knowledge about their type, but also about their
state’s foreclosure law and the marginal benefits of judicial-foreclosure over non-judicial-foreclosure to delinquent
borrowers. These assumptions are unlikely to be met. While borrowers tend to understand the basic terms of their
mortgage, they often are ignorant of slightly more complex features like the extent to which the interest rate on an
adjustable-rate mortgage can change (Bucks & Pence, 2008). In light of borrowers’ lack of knowledge of these
terms, the notion that borrowers consider their state’s foreclosure law when applying for mortgages seems unlikely.
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applications that they would otherwise accept (and, naturally, that applicants also believe would
benefit them) suggests that there are attendant welfare losses. By raising the stakes to banks of
lending to borrowers who then default, borrower protections encourage banks to commit the
converse error: rejecting applicants who would perform on their mortgages. To the extent that
(reverse-redlining notwithstanding) minority and lower-income borrowers have lesser access to
mortgage markets (Goodman, 2017), these losses fall disproportionately on these communities.
Tradeoffs of this type are familiar across many areas of regulatory policy (for instance, a
minimum-wage law may benefit those that are employed but increase unemployment). Whether
the tradeoff enhances or diminishes social welfare here is beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, the article suggests a more modest—but previously overlooked—conclusion: that
foreclosure law should be seen as a form of ex post financial regulation, with similar attendant
costs and benefits as with other types of regulations. As policymakers continue to restructure the
national and state-level financial regulatory architecture, they would be well-advised to consider
judicial foreclosure as an important form of regulation.
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APPENDIX

This appendix contains information concerning the 14 state dyads employed in the stateborder regression discontinuity design and bi-state metro area regression (each of these metro
area is contained within one of the 14 dyads).
Table A.1 lists the relevant foreclosure laws in the states within these dyads, showing
that, while not completely identical, each pair of states has substantially similar foreclosure laws
(except for the judicial/non-judicial-foreclosure difference).
Table A.2 reports the demographic composition of the populations of applicants and
approved applicants in both judicial- and non-judicial-foreclosure jurisdictions. The table also
includes descriptive statistics concerning features of the census tracts in which those applicants
reside, as well as the rate spread for loans offered to approved applicants. These summary
statistics show that, with limited exception, the characteristics of applicants and approved
applications are broadly similar across jurisdictions. (The most prominent exception is that
applicants in judicial-foreclosure jurisdictions tend to reside in census tracts with a high
proportion of minority residents, compared to applicants in other jurisdictions and accepted
applicants in all jurisdictions.)
Table A.3 reports the same demographic characteristics in all 50 states, for comparison.

State
(Jud. Forecl.)

Table A.1: Foreclosure Procedures in the 14 State Dyads
Min. Notice
Right to Cure
Redemption
Deficiency
Period (No.
Judgment
of Notices)

COLORADO-NEBRASKA
Colorado

48 days (2)

Yes, until sale

No

Nebraska
(J.F. required)

28 days (1)

Yes, until sale

No

Obtainable up to
fair market value
(FMV)
Obtainable up to
FMV

* CONNECTICUT-MASSACHUSETTS
Connecticut
(J.F. required)

21 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable

Massachusetts

21 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable

*DELAWARE-MARYLAND
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Delaware
(J.F. required)
Maryland

10 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable

12 days (2)

No

No

Obtainable

14 days (2)

No

No

Obtainable

15 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable up to
FMV

Obtainable up to
FMV
Obtainable up to
FMV

FLORIDA-GEORGIA
Florida
(J.F. required)
Georgia

GEORGIA-SOUTH CAROLINA
Georgia

15 days (1)

No

No

South Carolina
(J.F. required)

21 days (3)

No

No

Iowa
(J.F. mostly)

28 days (1)

Yes, 12 mos.
after sale

Obtainable

Minnesota

28 days (1)

Yes, until 30
days after notice
of default
Yes, until decree

Yes, until 6-12
mos. post-sale

Obtainable up to
FMV

15 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable

20 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable

15 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable

14 days (1)

No

No

Obtainable

21 days (1)

Yes, until sale

No

Obtainable

21 days (1)

Yes, until sale

No

Obtainable

*IOWA-MINNESOTA

KENTUCKY-MISSOURI
Kentucky
(J.F. required)
Missouri

KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA
Kentucky
(J.F. required)
Virginia

LOUISIANA-MISSISSIPPI
Louisiana
(J.F. required)
Mississippi
LOUISIANA-TEXAS
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Louisiana
(J.F. required)
Texas

21 days (1)

Yes, until sale

No

Obtainable

20 days (2)

Yes, until 20
days after notice
of default

No

Obtainable up to
FMV

Obtainable up to
FMV
Obtainable

Obtainable up to
FMV
Obtainable up to
FMV

*MINNESOTA-WISCONSIN
Minnesota

28 days (1)

Yes, until sale

Wisconsin
(J.F. mostly)

21 days (1)

Yes, until
judgment

Yes, until 6-12
mos. post-sale
Yes, until 6-12
mos. post-sale

28 days (1)

Yes, until decree

No

28 days (1)

No

No

NEBRASKA-SOUTH DAKOTA
Nebraska
(J.F. required)
South Dakota

NORTH CAROLINA-SOUTH CAROLINA
North Carolina

60 days (3)

No

No

South Carolina
(J.F. required)

21 days (1)

No

No

No

No

Obtainable up to
FMV
Obtainable up to
FMV

OHIO-WEST VIRGINIA
Ohio
(J.F. required)
West Virginia

30 days (1)

Obtainable

“reasonable” Yes, until ~15
No
Obtainable
period (1)
days post-default
* signifies that, while judicial-foreclosure is not technically required, use of non-judicialforeclosure is sufficiently onerous such that the judicial process is employed in the
overwhelming majority of foreclosures.
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Table A.2: Characteristics of Loan Applications in the 14 State Dyads
ALL APPLICATIONS
ACCEPTED APPLICATIONS
Total

JF
States

Non-JF
States

Total

JF
States

Non-JF
States

Total Applicants (thousands)

3407.1

1514.7

1892.4

2091.5

892.3

1199.3

# of Caucasian Applicants

2360.0

1043.7

1316.4

1621.8

723.0

898.8

# of Hispanic Apps.

282.1

116.3

165.8

165.2

73.2

91.9

# of African American Apps.

313.0

108.1

205.0

179.1

60.1

119.0

# of Single Female Apps.

908.3

388.4

520.0

589.0

253.3

335.7

# in 25th Income Percentile

642.9

294.9

348.8

363.6

170.5

193.0

# in 75th Income Percentile

1275.7

504.0

771.7

754.3

303.3

451.0

-

-

-

2.22
(1.02)

2.18
(0.94)

2.25
(1.06)

$70
($46)

$68
($45)

$71
($46)

$77
($45)

$85
($45)

$72
($46)

Median Pop.

5202
(2244)

5136
(2187)

5123
(2194)

5038
(1557)

5038
(1420)

5005
(1527)

Mean Minority Pop. %

15.4%
(49.1%)

21.0%
(62.2%)

11.1%
(35.4%)

15.6%
(48.2%)

16.2%
(43.1%)

15.3%
(51.2%)

Median Household Income

$54
($20)

$54
($21)

$55
($21)

$55
($20)

$58
($23)

$51
($22)

Tract HH Income-to-Metro
Area HH Income Ratio

1.19
(0.42)

1.18
(0.44)

1.19
(0.45)

1.23
(0.44)

1.21
(0.46)

1.24
(0.46)

Median # of Owner-Occupied
Units

2029.8
(909)

1983
(890)

2064
(922)

1502
(757)

1470
(737)

1525
(771)

Applicant Level

Mean Rate Spread
Applicant Median Income

Census-Tract Level

County Level
(All figures in miles)
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Mean Distance to Border with
Other State in Dyad

113.2
(69.8)

118.2
(64.0)

110.4
(72.3)

129.3
(63.5)

142.6
(55.3)

120.7
(66.9)

Income figures in thousands of 2005 dollars. Table includes all loan applications processed by an
OCC-regulated banks within the 14 state dyads in 2005. Applicants in the 75th percentile for
income excludes applicants with over $1 million in annual income. Associated standard deviations
(or, for medians, median absolute deviations) reported in parentheses where appropriate.
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Table A.3: Characteristics of Loan Applications
ALL APPLICATIONS
APPROVED APPLICATIONS
Total
JF
Non-JF
Total
JF
Non-JF
States
States
States
States
Applicant Level
Total Applicants (thousands)

7082.6

2980.4

4102.2

4342.8

1860.3

2482.5

# of Caucasian Applicants

4812.3

2110.1

2702.2

3315.3

1469.3

1846.0

# of Hispanic Apps.
dim
# of African American Apps.

624.0

222.0

396.9

376.6

139.5

237.1

526.9

219.2

307.6

299.4

120.7

178.7

# of Single Female Apps.

1831.0

794.7

1036.3

1191.7

517.9

673.8

# in 25th Income Percentile

1450.4

618.7

831.7

682.8

331.1

351.7

# in 75th Income Percentile

1753.7

727.6

1026.1

1450.5

555.6

894.9

-

-

-

2.22
(1.02)

2.21
(1.01)

2.22
(1.02)

$70
($46)

$73
($43)

$70
($46)

$77
($52)

$70
($46)

$81
($56.3)

Median Pop.

5223
(2546)

6124
(3035)

5221
(2543)

4831
(2228)

4671
(2175)

4957
(2258)

Mean Minority Pop. %

26.0%
(26.2%)

37.1%
(26.4%)

26.0%
(26.2%)

27.6%
(18.1%)

31.5%
(21.3%)

24.7%
(15.3%)

Median Household Income

$55
($22)

$53
($21)

$55
($24)

$55
($21)

$56
($22)

$54
($22)

Mean Tract HH Income-toMetro Area HH Income Ratio

1.12
(0.39)

1.11
(0.39)

1.13
(0.39)

1.14
(0.39)

1.16
(0.43)

1.13
(0.37)

Median # of Owner-Occupied
Units

1382
(681)

1385
(683)

1381
(679)

1534
(860)

1681
(984)

1472
(793)

Mean Rate Spread

Applicant Median Income

Census-Tract Level

Income figures in thousands of 2005 dollars. Table includes all loan applications processed by an
OCC-regulated banks in 2005. Applicants in the 75th percentile for income excludes applicants with
over $1 million in annual income. Associated standard deviations (or, for medians, median
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absolute deviations) reported in parentheses where appropriate.
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Figures

Figure 1: Mandatory Judicial Foreclosure Procedures, by State
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Figure 2: Loan Approval-to-Application Ratios, by Group & Jurisdiction
0.8

White

0.6
0.4

High Income High Income
Female
Female

0.2

Percent of All Approved Applicants

White

Low Income
Low Income
HispanicBlack
Hispanic
Black
0.2

Judicial Foreclosure States
Nonjudicial Foreclosure States
0.4
Percent of All Applicants
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0.6

0.8

[Figure 3: First Differences for Nationwide Models]

Figure reports simulated first differences in the expected likelihood of loan approval (Models 1
& 3) and being offered a subprime loan (Models 2 & 4) when one shifts the value of JF
Requirement from 0 to 1 while holding all other right-hand-side variables at their central
tendencies. Bars signify 95% confidence intervals. Quantities of interest estimated by running
1000 simulations in Zelig using logistic regression models. See Christine Choirat, James
Honaker, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software (2015
ed.), available on-line at www.zeligproject.org (last accessed July 11, 2017). Unit of analysis:
loan application. Observations: 1,000,000. (Due to computational limitations, these simulated
first differences were generated using a randomly selected sample of 1 million loan applications
out of the 7.3 million applications in the dataset.)
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[Figure 4: First Differences for Bi-State Metro Area Models]

Figure reports simulated first differences in the expected likelihood of loan approval (Models 1
& 3) and being offered a subprime loan (Models 2 & 4) when one shifts the value of JF
Requirement from 0 to 1 while holding all other right-hand-side variables at their central
tendencies. Bars signify 95% confidence intervals. Quantities of interest estimated by running
1000 simulations in Zelig using logistic regression models. See Christine Choirat, James
Honaker, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software (2015
ed.), available on-line at www.zeligproject.org (last accessed July 11, 2017). Unit of analysis:
loan application. Observations: 403,068 (Models 1 & 3); 130,808 (Models 2 & 4).
Figure 5: State Borders Included in Regression Discontinuity Design
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Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics: Dependent Variables
Mean
Std.
Min.
Max.
Dev.

n

Approval Decision

0.60

--

0

1

7,264,449

Subprime Loan

0.04

--

0

1

4,346,421

Rate Spread

2.22

1.02

1.9134

12.25

4,346,421

Table includes all loan applications processed by OCC-regulated banks in 2005.
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The HMDA does not require the reporting of rate spreads less than 3 percentage points. As explained supra, I
impute a rate spread 1.91 for approved loan applications that do not meet this threshold.
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Table 2(a): Summary Statistics for All Applications: Independent Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min.
Max.
Applicant-Level Covariates
JF Requirement

0.42

--

0

1

Right to Cure

0.49

--

0

1

Right to Redeem

0.55

--

0

1

Anti-Deficiency

0.26

--

0

1

Black

0.10

--

0

1

Hispanic

0.11

--

0

1

Income (Log)

4.61

1.40

0.00

8.24

Loan-to-Income Ratio

2.70

2.02

0.00

875.35

Median HH Income*

$46.5

$22.4

$9

$317

Tract-to-Metro Area HH Income

1.12

0.39

0.20

5.39

Owner-Occupied Units

1499

795.58

2

3454

Minority Population Percent

0.29

0.24

0.00

1.00

Census-Tract-Level Covariates

n = 7,264,449
*
Denotes that median and median absolute deviation, rather than mean
and standard deviation, are reported. Median Household Income
measured in thousands of 2005 dollars. Table includes all loan
applications processed by an OCC-regulated banks in 2005.
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Table 2(b): Summary Statistics for Accepted Applications: Independent Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min.
Max.
Applicant-Level Covariates
JF Requirement

0.48

--

0

1

Right to Cure

0.57

--

0

1

Right to Redeem

0.49

--

0

1

Anti-Deficiency

0.27

--

0

1

Black

0.08

--

0

1

Hispanic

0.10

--

0

1

Income (Log)

4.53

1.09

0.00

8.24

Loan-to-Income Ratio

2.37

1.84

0.00

30.47

Median HH Income*

$51.3

$23.8

$15

$317

Tract-to-Metro Area HH Income

1.14

0.39

0.35

5.39

Owner-Occupied Units

1915

727.67

398

3454

Minority Population Percent

0.32

0.25

0.00

1.00

Census-Tract-Level Covariates

n = 4,346,421
*
Denotes that median and median absolute deviation, rather than mean
and standard deviation, are reported. Median Household Income
measured in thousands of 2005 dollars. Table includes all loan
applications approved by an OCC-regulated banks in 2005.
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Table 3: Nationwide Regression Analysis
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
App. Approved?
Subprime Loan App. Approved?

Model 4:
Subprime Loan

JF Requirement

-0.091***
(0.002)

-0.154***
(0.005)

-0.155***
(0.008)

-0.447***
(0.013)

App.’s Income (Log)

0.047***
(0.001)

0.008***
(0.002)

0.023***
(0.001)

-0.277***
(0.003)

Black App.

-0.352***
(0.003)

-0.006
(0.009)

-0.315***
(0.004)

0.524***
(0.007)

Hispanic App.

-0.020***
(0.009)

0.035
(0.021)

-0.181***
(0.011)

-0.209***
(0.022)

JF * Income

--

--

0.058***
(0.002)

0.058***
(0.004)

JF * Black

--

--

-0.087***
(0.006)

-0.119***
(0.010)

JF * Hispanic

--

--

-0.061**
(0.019)

-0.118**
(0.039)

Demographic Variables

Models include the following census-tract-level demographic variables:
median household income; ratio of tract median income to metro area
median income; minority population percent; number of owner-occupied
units; population. Models also include individual-level variables for the
applicant’s loan-to-income ratio and whether the applicant is female.

Other Features of
Foreclosure Law

Models include dichotomous variables for whether state law contains a
mortgagor’s right to cure, mortgagor’s right to redeem, and mortgagee’s
right to seek a deficiency judgment.

Observations

7,264,449

4,346,421

7,264,449

4,346,421

Unit of analysis: (Models 1 & 3) loan applications; (Models 2 & 4) approved loan applications.
Dependent variable: (1 & 3) whether applicant was approved; (2 & 4) whether the offered rate is greater
than 3 percentage points higher than the Treasury yield of the same length as the offered loan. Model:
logistic regression. Parameter estimates for the intercepts are omitted. *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p <
0.01, * p < 0.05. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the state level.
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Table 4: Bi-state Metro Area Regression Analysis
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
App. Approved? Subprime Loan App. Approved?
JF Requirement

Model 4:
Subprime Loan

-0.147***
(0.019)

-0.029
(0.032)

-0.138
(0.077)

-0.648***
(0.134)

0.008
(0.006)

-0.310***
(0.013)

-0.006
(0.007)

-0.331
(0.014)

Black App.

-0.431***
(0.021)

0.725***
(0.031)

-0.432***
(0.021)

0.718***
(0.033)

Hispanic App.

-0.362***
(0.075)

-0.277
(0.144)

-0.335***
(0.078)

-0.288
(0.150)

JF * Income

--

--

0.068***
(0.017)

0.135***
(0.031)

JF * Black

--

--

0.004
(0.068)

0.082
(0.094)

JF * Hispanic

--

--

-0.432
(0.307)

0.207
(0.550)

App.’s Income (Log)

Demographic Variables

Models include median household income; ratio of tract median income to
metro area median income; minority population percent; number of
owner-occupied units; population. Models also include individual-level
variables for the applicant’s loan-to-income ratio and whether the
applicant is female.

Metro Area Fixed Effects

Models include fixed effects for each of 13 metropolitan areas that
encompass both judicial- and non-judicial-foreclosure states.

Observations

403,068

130,808

403,068

130,808

Unit of analysis: (Models 1 & 3) loan applications; (Models 2 & 4) approved loan applications.
Dependent variable: (1 & 3) whether applicant was approved; (2 & 4) whether the offered rate is greater
than 3 percentage points higher than the Treasury yield of the same length as the offered loan. Model:
logistic regression. Parameter estimates for the intercepts and fixed effects are omitted. *** signifies p <
0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the MSA level.
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Table 5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Model 1:
Model 2:
App. Approved?
Subprime Loan
All Applicants
n = 217,319

-0.071†
(0.040)

-0.014*
(0.013)

Black Apps. Only
n = 24,451

-0.102†
(0.024)

-0.084
(0.059)

Hispanic Apps. Only
n = 6,618

-0.089
(0.075)

-0.057
(0.051)

Apps. at or below 25th Income Pctile.
n = 51,671

-0.093†
(0.052)

-0.015***
(0.006)

Apps. at or above 75th Income Pctile.
n = 46,217

-0.030
(0.094)

-0.001
(0.001)

Bias-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Assignment Variable: Location in JF
state. Unit of analysis: (Model 1) loan applications; (Model 2) approved loan
applications. Dependent variable: (1) whether applicant was approved; (2) whether
the offered rate is greater than 3 percentage points higher than the Treasury yield of
the same length as the offered loan. *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05,
† p < 0.10. Parentheses contain standard errors.
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Table 6: Effects of Judicial Foreclosure Requirement &
Length of Foreclosure Timeline on Lender Behavior
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
App.
Subprime
App.
Approved?
Loan
Approved?
JF Requirement

Model 4:
Subprime
Loan

-0.192**
(0.072)

-0.127
(0.118)

-0.117
(0.109)

-0.564**
(0.184)

Months to Foreclose

0.001
(0.002)

0.004
(0.004)

0.001
(0.002)

-0.004
(0.004)

JF * Months to Foreclose

-0.002
(0.006)

-0.014
(0.010)

-0.002
(0.006)

-0.015
(0.010)

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

403,068

130,808

403,068

130,808

Applicant-Level
Demographic Variables
(& interactions with JF)
Tract-Level
Demographic Variables
& Metro-Area Fixed
Effects
Observations

Unit of analysis: (Model 1) loan applications; (Model 2) approved loan applications located in
bi-state metro areas. Dependent variable: (1) whether applicant was approved; (2) whether the
offered rate is greater than 3 percentage points higher than the Treasury yield of the same length
as the offered loan. Model: logistic regression. Parameter estimates for the intercepts are omitted.
*** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at
the MSA level.
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